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Congress to act through sunset dates, penalties like sequestration, or other undesirable 
policy outcomes. Alternatively, the legislative product itself may spontaneously update 
without further action by Congress, a category I label “dynamic legislation.” For 
instance, during consideration of recent tax legislation, lawmakers proposed that certain 
tax cuts be automatically ratcheted down if the bill failed to generate sufficient economic 
growth and that delayed tax increases not go into effect if revenue hurdles were met. 
Of these various tools, I argue that dynamic legislation has the most potential to 
combat legislative inertia while also meeting the challenges of the democratic process. 
Specifically, dynamic legislation outperforms the other tools because it leverages the 
resources of the administrative state without succumbing to excessive deference, it does 
not impermissibly entrench the current majority, and it is not as susceptible to the 
pathologies of the political economy and budget processes. Dynamic legislation also 
provides a mechanism by which Congress can evaluate itself, automatically adjusting 
laws depending on how well they are performing. Dynamic legislation holds 
particular promise in areas, like fiscal policy, where these concerns are acute, and 
where its design is not too costly. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, Congress has lurched from one fiscal or budget crisis to 
another. Expiring tax laws, government shutdowns, debt ceiling limits, and 
sequesters have created an atmosphere of legislative chaos, requiring 
congressional action to avoid dire consequences. On the precipice of each cliff, 
real costs have ensued from the anticipation that Congress will fail to reach a 
deal.1 Future crises seem inevitable, as the nation’s debt repeatedly approaches 
the ceiling, clashes over annual spending levels increase, sequestration 
continues to loom, and temporary tax policies once again take hold.2 
Yet these events are of Congress’s own making, a direct and foreseeable 
product of the legal mechanisms it has created. Why then does Congress keep 
setting itself up for failure, creating games of chicken that have the potential 
 
1 In 2011, for instance, a ratings agency downgraded American bonds for the first time, citing 
the brinksmanship over fiscal policy as evidence that America’s political institutions have become 
too dysfunctional to meet ongoing fiscal and economic challenges. STANDARD & POOR’S, 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM RATING LOWERED TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL 
RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 3 (2011); see also Zachary A. Goldfarb, 
S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/
2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI_story.html [https://perma.cc/JXS2-E547]. 
2 As of this writing, congressional leaders enacted a stopgap measure to fund the government 
but only for a short period, ensuring another fiscal clash. Fourth Continuing Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 2018, Federal Register Printing Savings, Healthy Kids, Health-Related Taxes, and 
Budgetary Effects, Pub. L. No.115-120, 132 Stat. 28 (2018). On the tax side, Congress recently enacted 
temporary tax cuts, many of which expire in 2025. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 
2054 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This will likely set up another fiscal 
cliff similar to the one in 2012, which was created, in part, by the expiring Bush tax cuts. See David 
Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 146 (2015). 
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to end catastrophically?3 In designing these mechanisms, Congress recognizes 
its limited capacity to respond to evolving circumstances. The legislative 
process contains a status quo bias, making congressional response to changing 
social, technological, environmental, economic, and foreign policy conditions 
challenging. Other factors have combined with constitutional design to create 
a system of government that, in the view of many, is hopelessly gridlocked. 
To compensate for the status quo bias in lawmaking, lawmakers have 
developed devices that aim to provide paths to legislative change, such as 
prodding Congress into action by threatening policy cliffs or crises. 
Although scholars have long addressed extracongressional means of 
addressing this status quo bias, such as judicial expansion of the common law, 
dynamic statutory interpretation, and agency delegation,4 only recently has 
focus shifted to these congressional tools.5 Assuming it is possible to achieve, 
locating the solution to legislative inertia within the lawmaking body itself, as 
opposed to the judiciary or agencies, is preferable from the perspective of 
institutional competence and separation of powers. Yet, as the legislative crises 
 
3 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, TAXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S MARCH 
TOWARDS BANKRUPTCY 121-22 (2006) (describing fiscal gap politics as involving, in game 
theory terms, games of chicken). 
4 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985) 
(proposing that courts sunset statutes to overcome legislative inertia); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., 
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9-11 (1994) (theorizing about the judicial updating of laws 
through the interpretation of statutes against a backdrop of changing contexts, norms, and public 
values); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2, 2-7 (2014) 
(setting forth a descriptive and normative account of agencies as the primary updaters of statutes); 
Jeffrey Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292 (2001) (contending that the modern function of the regulatory state is 
to allow a means for the federal government to respond to evolving circumstances). 
5 In prior work, I have explored and critiqued several of these congressional tools, including 
temporary legislation and the reconciliation process. Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2011) (arguing for a presumption against temporary legislation, 
especially in the context of tax legislation); Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2121, 2144-48 (2013) [hereinafter Kysar, Reconciling Congress] (critiquing 
the reconciliation process as an agent for tax reform); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding 
Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Budget Process] (arguing 
that subjecting the budget process to partisan wrangling challenged fundamental aspects of the 
budget process itself); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset 
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (2006) [hereinafter Kysar, Sun Also Rises] 
(arguing that sunset provisions “do not function as ‘good government’ tools in the tax legislative 
arena”). For other notable works on temporary legislation, see Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary 
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (2007), making a positive case for the use of sunsets, 
and George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 193-94 (2009), defending temporary legislation as fostering political 
accountability and fiscal restraint. In an important article, David Kamin discusses congressional 
tools that overcome the less general (but related) problem of “policy drift” in the legislative 
process. Like myself, Kamin supports the promise of dynamic legislation but for substantive 
policy reasons largely apart from my own, which are grounded in democratic process. David 
Kamin, Legislating for Good Times and Bad, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 149, 202-04 (2017). 
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of the past decade demonstrate, the tools that Congress most often employs 
can have devastating effects. It thus seems wise to explore Congress’s entire 
arsenal of anti-status quo devices, including those that are less often exercised. 
The congressional anti-status quo devices can be divided into three main 
categories.6 Procedural mechanisms—like the reconciliation process—may 
eliminate barriers to legislating. I label these mechanisms “veto bridges” as 
an antonym to the often used “veto gates,” which refer to those points in the 
legislative process that can derail legislative proposals.7 Laws may also prompt 
Congress to act through sunset dates or penalties like sequestration or other 
undesirable policy outcomes. I identify this category as “prompting 
legislation.” Finally, the legislative product itself may automatically update 
without further action by Congress through the use of what I call “dynamic 
legislation.”8 This type of legislation spontaneously adjusts legal rules to 
future circumstances based on predetermined, external criteria. 
I contend that it is this last category—dynamic legislation—that has the 
most untapped potential from a democratic process perspective.9 Specifically, 
 
6 This typology largely tracks and benefits from David Kamin’s categorization for 
congressional devices against policy drift. Kamin, supra note 5, at 171-82. There are, however, 
differences between them, and I have departed from Kamin’s terminology in order to highlight these 
differences and also to connect the categories with the legislative process literature. 
7 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11 (1994) (using the number of veto gates that need “passing” as 
one factor impacting “degree of difficulty for changing a policy bargain”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444-46 (2008) (naming 
and describing nine such veto gates). 
8 I use the term “dynamic legislation” to relate the concept to “dynamic statutory interpretation,” 
William Eskridge’s famous theorizing of the interpretive process as a means through which the courts 
and agencies assist in the adaptation of law to evolving circumstances, norms, and public values. See 
ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 5-6 (“My initial and primary goal is to advance a thesis: that statutory 
interpretation is dynamic . . . as a description of what courts and agencies do . . . .”). Dynamic 
legislation also aims to achieve updating of policy, but does so through means intrinsic, rather than 
extrinsic, to the law and Congress. Kamin refers to dynamic legislation as “automatic-adjustment 
mechanisms.” Kamin, supra note 5, at 171 (describing an “automatic-adjustment mechanism” as one 
that updates a legal framework for a “new set of conditions”).  
9 Tax is an area that currently employs dynamic legislation; however, the full potential of 
this device has not been realized even in that context. Some, for instance, have argued that the 
tax code needs to take better account of inflation. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle, 
Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID 
INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 347 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, and Joseph A. Pechman 
eds., 1988); Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73 MINN. L. 
REV. 1217, 1220 (1989) (arguing that the rejection of indexation “may reflect a failure to recognize 
the full economic and political significance of inflation’s effects”); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the 
Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537, 538-39 (1993) (describing problems that may arise as a result of 
failing to properly account for inflation). Tax brackets could also be adjusted annually to take into 
account not only inflation, as is the case now, but also inequality and regional differences. 
Leonard E. Burman et al., The Rising-Tide Tax System: Indexing (at Least Partially) for Changes 
in Inequality 1-2 (June 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~shiller/behmacro/
2006-11/burman-rohaly-shiller.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA84-25RN]; see also David Albouy, The 
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I argue that dynamic legislation outperforms the other anti-status quo devices 
because it leverages the resources of the administrative state without 
succumbing to excessive deference, does not impermissibly entrench the 
current majority, and is not as susceptible to the pathologies of the political 
economy and budget processes. Democratic considerations, in other words, 
weigh in favor of dynamic legislation as a preferred tool against legislative 
inertia. This Article thus builds the case that dynamic legislation has much to 
offer categorically. It therefore departs from the scant scholarship that exists 
on the topic, which has traditionally judged dynamic legislation from the 
standpoint of the particular policies at issue.10 
From a practical perspective, each of the aforementioned tools have 
limitations. Veto bridges are unenforceable and nonsubstantive in nature. 
Prompting legislation disrupts planning by private and public actors. 
Dynamic legislation is often costly to design, requiring information 
upfront.11 The impact of these limitations is context specific, but dynamic 
legislation holds the most potential in areas where quantitative indices can 
be developed to minimize its design costs. It also will be desirable when the 
area of law presents acute concerns in the democratic categories outlined 
above—criteria in which dynamic legislation performs favorably. 
Notably, fiscal policy shares all of these qualities. This partially explains 
why this area already contains a greater degree of dynamic legislation than 
other areas. Several features of the tax code, for instance, are indexed to 
inflation.12 Recently, during consideration of the 2017 tax bill, lawmakers 
proposed that the bill’s tax cuts be automatically ratcheted down if the bill 
 
Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation, 117 J. POL. ECON. 635, 635-36 (2009) (“Indexing 
the tax code to local costs would eliminate federal tax differences across cities that vary in 
productivity but exacerbate them across cities that vary in quality of life.”); Louis Kaplow, 
Regional Cost-of-Living Adjustments in Tax/Transfer Schemes, 51 TAX L. REV. 175, 177 (1996) 
(analyzing the efficiency of tax adjustments based on regional differences); Michael S. Knoll & 
Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 987, 989 (2003) (“[T]he failure to adjust individuals’ tax liabilities for different 
regional living costs misallocates capital and labor throughout the economy . . . .”). I suggest 
other possible reforms below. See infra notes 223–250 and accompanying text. 
10 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The More it Changes, the More it Stays the Same? Automatic Indexing 
and Current Policy, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 64, 85 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds., 
2017) (stating that one should judge dynamic legislation on the basis of the “meta-policy” at issue). 
For sources exemplifying this approach, see sources cited supra, note 9. 
11 See David Kamin, In Good Times and Bad: Designing Legislation that Responds to Fiscal 
Uncertainty 22 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Inst., Working Paper 
No. 7 (2014)) (making a similar proposal in the Social Security context). 
12 See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (updating the tax rate tables and various credits 
and deductions to take inflation into account). 
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failed to generate sufficient economic growth,13 and that other tax increases 
be turned off if a revenue hurdle was met.14 
Other areas of fiscal policy also use dynamic legislation to some extent. For 
instance, certain unemployment insurance benefits are keyed off a state’s overall 
unemployment level. Some features of Social Security are indexed for inflation, 
and Medicare premiums are tied to health care costs to an extent. Even still, 
dynamic legislation is underutilized in these and other contexts. The design 
features of dynamic legislation could be particularly useful in designing 
Pigouvian taxes because they could be calibrated to the cost of current negative 
externalities as they reveal themselves.15 Phase-ins and phase-outs that adjust 
according to varying circumstances, rather than dates on the calendar, hold 
promise, as do countercyclical and regionally targeted laws. Finally, laws could 
be tied to one another or, like the 2017 tax proposals, to a budgetary goal. 
Notably, many of these examples show that dynamic legislation also provides a 
mechanism by which Congress can evaluate itself, automatically adjusting laws 
depending on how well they are performing. 
In Part I, I first address the antecedent question of whether the current 
level of status quo bias in lawmaking is desirable. In Part II, I lay out possible 
tools that Congress can use to overcome the status quo bias—veto bridges, 
prompting legislation, and dynamic legislation—and their effectiveness at 
achieving that goal. In Part III, I examine democratic considerations, 
including those relating to interaction with the administrative state, 
entrenchment, the political economy, and the budget process. Across all of 
these categories, I argue that dynamic legislation outperforms the other tools. 
Finally, in Part IV, I consider in what circumstances dynamic legislation 
should be employed and offer suggestions for its implementation. 
I. IS THE STATUS QUO BIAS A PROBLEM? 
Before addressing solutions to the status quo bias in American lawmaking, 
one may rightfully ask if there even is a problem. After all, the Constitution’s 
many hurdles to lawmaking are part of its contemplated design, intentionally 
 
13 Jacob Pramuk, Senate GOP Rushes to Change Tax Bill as Setback Hits Hours Before Vote, CNBC 
(Nov. 30, 2017), at https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/parliamentarian-says-revenue-trigger-in-gop-
tax-plan-will-not-work-under-rules-of-senate.html [https://perma.cc/MY6Z-JRRV]. 
14 Jonathan Curry, Senate Republicans Contort Tax Bill to Fit Byrd Rule Box, TAX NOTES (Nov. 
16, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/senate-republicans-contort-tax-bill-fit-byrd-rule-box 
[https://perma.cc/P59V-EL2B]. 
15 Pigouvian taxes are corrective taxes that cause parties to internalize the marginal social 
costs of an activity that are not already included in the activity’s market costs (i.e. externalities). 
Ideally, the taxes would be precisely set to these externalities. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WELFARE 192-96 (4th ed. 1932). 
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balancing between policy stability and the whims of majority rule.16 Veto 
gates like bicameralism and the executive veto collectively weigh heavily in 
favor of maintaining the status quo.17 
Yet much of today’s legislative stalemate can be attributed to dynamics 
wholly apart from constitutional design. Supermajority rules, for instance, 
are absent from the Constitution yet contribute significantly to congressional 
stalemate.18 Additionally, the committee system is an extraconstitutional 
culprit of congressional gridlock, adding yet another combination of 
decisionmakers who must reach consensus.19 
Nonetheless, from a normative perspective, it might seem that the status 
quo bias in lawmaking is not problematic. For instance, because we follow 
majority rule, we should respect existing laws since they represent the 
preferences of the majority.20 Stable law also encourages investment and 
facilitates planning.21 There are, however, circumstances where we may wish 
to depart from allegiance to the status quo. 
The legislative process, at times, fails to reflect the preferences of lawmakers 
and constituents. This breakdown is due to various phenomena such as cycling 
problems, strategic behavior, and the inability to gauge the intensity of 
legislative preferences.22 Condorcet’s paradox, for instance, illustrates that, 
 
16 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 441-42 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1999) (characterizing the separation of the executive from the legislature as “additional security 
against the [enactment] of improper laws,” the threat of which overcomes “[t]he injury which may 
possibly be done by defeating a few good laws”). 
17 William Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756, 
756-760 (2012). 
18 Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 
1107-08 (detailing the rise of the filibuster and its contribution to gridlock). 
19 Aaron Andrew-Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rule: Entrenchment, Separation of 
Powers and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 355 (2003). Other extraconstitutional 
hurdles stymy lawmaking, such as getting support from the Rules Committee to place the bill on 
the legislative calendar. Id. 
20 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 163 (1993). 
21 This point was not lost on the Framers. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). (“But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with 
every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private life, and 
becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions.”). 
22 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545-46 (1988); see also 
KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 95 (2d ed. 1963) (“It was in this 
context that Condorcet discovered that pairwise majority comparisons might lead to . . . an 
indeterminacy in the social choice.”); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
124-34 (1989) (describing the strategic behavior in the collective action problem); WILLIAM RIKER, 
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF CHOICE 137 (1982) (“[A]ny system of voting can be 
manipulated to produce outcomes advantageous to the manipulators or at least different from 
outcomes in the absence of manipulation.”). 
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under certain conditions, the order in which decisions are made, as opposed to 
majority preferences, determines the outcome of majority voting.23 
Collective action problems may also prevent legislators from voting for 
their primary preferences if others defect from a common goal. For instance, 
suppose each member of Congress prefers deficit reduction. Constituents 
may punish individual members if they vote to take away desirable but costly 
benefits unless other members also vote to do the same. It is thus in every 
member’s interest to vote in favor of deficit reduction. Still, individual 
members may defect from that common goal if they suspect others of 
potentially doing so. In this case, deficit reduction is not achieved even 
though it would reflect aggregate preferences. 
Other phenomena may lead to laws remaining on the books even though they 
diverge from current legislative preferences. Increased polarization in American 
politics may create a bias for existing policies, rather than new, more preferable 
ones, by impeding compromise deals.24 In this environment, politicians may 
disagree only for the sake of disagreement so that they may differentiate 
themselves from the other party, rather than because of policy preferences.25 
Congress also has limited resources and time, which constrains its agenda. 
Even though congressional preferences on many issues may have shifted, 
Congress only has the ability to address a subset of these issues. Additionally, 
each veto gate in the legislative process creates an opportunity for the policy 
proposal to die without sufficient advocacy. 
Interest group dynamics may also stymie the ability of the legislative process 
to gauge preferences accurately. Public choice scholars describe the legislative 
process as a marketplace of policies, with different types of legislation producing 
varying levels of supply and demand.26 Interest groups are advantaged over the 
diffuse public because of their greater ability to coordinate among themselves, 
and they are generally more motivated. This increased motivation is a result of 
their relatively small numbers resulting in a group’s membership experiencing a 
greater proportion of harm and benefit as compared to the public. Interest 
groups are an important factor in ensuring that the policy issue stays on the 
congressional agenda at each veto gate. We should therefore expect a greater 
 
23 Assuming that Congress would prefer Policy A over Policy B, Policy B over Policy C, and 
Policy C over Policy A, majority rule results in no clear, stable outcome. Policy A will win if it faces 
the victor of a vote between Policy B and Policy C. Policy C, however, will become law if Congress 
first chooses between Policy A and Policy B. See generally, ARROW, supra note 22, at 3. 
24 Kamin, supra note 5, at 160. 
25 Id. The work of Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal uses NOMINATE 
scores to measure polarization in Congress and has shown a widening chasm between the two 
political parties. NOLAN MCCARTY ET. AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY 
AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15-34 (2008). 
26 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 
371, 373-74 (1983) (laying out how influence factors play out when looking at different homogenous groups). 
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supply of private-regarding, as opposed to public-regarding legislation, even 
though the public would prefer the latter.27 
It may also be relevant to look at the degree of legislative stalemate to 
conclude that current levels are unacceptable, since they are out of line with 
historical norms. Political scientists have tried to quantify this trend. Sarah 
Binder has measured Congressional productivity regarding legislation on 
significant issues, concluding that congressional gridlock has basically doubled 
since the 1940s.28 Three-quarters of these issues are now subject to gridlock, 
according to Binder, whereas this number was as low as twenty-seven percent 
in the postwar, Great Society Congress.29 Although measures of gridlock at 
the time of the Founding have not been conducted, it is fair to say that gridlock 
has dramatically increased in the past few decades. 
All of this is not to say, of course, that the status quo should always be 
overturned. Sometimes, existing law reflects the best policy, and there are 
also costs to changing course. This discussion, however, aims to question the 
argument that the current level of policy stasis in U.S. lawmaking is 
preferable from either a normative or a constitutional perspective. Still, even 
skeptics of the above analysis may support the use of congressional tools since 
they do not require extracongressional interference with the lawmaking 
process. Congress surely has the insight and power to cure ills it perceives of 
itself. The remainder of this Article is devoted to analyzing the efficacy of 
those tools and their effects upon the democratic process. 
II. POTENTIAL TOOLS IN OVERCOMING THE STATUS QUO BIAS 
In this Part, I will describe in detail the potential tools that Congress can 
use to overcome the status quo bias in lawmaking—veto bridges, prompting 
legislation, and, lastly, dynamic legislation. 
A. Veto Bridges 
As discussed above, the status quo bias in American lawmaking results 
partially from Congress’s own internal procedures. Congress, however, has 
also devised internal mechanisms that make lawmaking easier. These “veto 
bridges” may reverse “veto gates” previously erected by Congress or may 
 
27 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J. 
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF 
PUBLIC POLICY 47-48 (5th ed. 2014). 
28 SARAH BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN 10 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRevTableRev.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Q3J-GR6M]. 
29 Id. 
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otherwise create shortcuts to lawmaking.30 Because veto bridges are 
congressional procedures governing lawmaking, they are a subset of a 
category of legislative rules. Article I vests “all legislative powers” in the 
House and Senate,31 and under the Rulemaking Clause states that each body 
“may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”32 Aside from making their own 
rules, each house has the power to unilaterally change or waive them, even 
when such rules are enacted through statutes.33 
Fast track processes are the most powerful of the veto bridges, establishing 
streamlined procedures for considering legislation. There are examples of fast 
track in a number of subject matters, including trade promotion authority, 
unfunded mandates, nullification of agency regulations, and the closure of 
military bases, among many others.34 Here, I largely examine one such process, 
reconciliation, because its importance has risen in recent years.35 
 
30 For discussions of congressional procedures reforming the lawmaking process, see generally 
Aaron Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities, and Some Puzzles, 10 U. Pa. 
J. Const. L. 447, 449 (2008) [hereinafter Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto?], exploring 
expedited rescissions, and Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, discussing fast track trade processes. Barbara 
Sinclair’s work on “unorthodox lawmaking” is also relevant since these rules set up alternative 
lawmaking procedures. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2012) (recognizing the important phenomenon 
of legislation that occurs outside the traditional path of lawmaking). Beth Garrett’s work on 
framework laws also discusses many of these processes about lawmaking. See generally Elizabeth 
Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF 
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294, 307-18 (Richard W. Bauman & Tvsi Kahana 
eds., 2006). The budget process has also historically been an area of procedural innovation. See ALLEN 
SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 142-49 (3d ed 2007) (focusing on the budget reconciliation 
process); CHARLES H. STEWART III, BUDGET REFORM POLITICS: THE DESIGN OF THE 
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1865-1921 (1989) (detailing the 
appropriations process); Allen Schick, A History of Reconciliation, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 116 (1993); 
Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws about Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409 
(2001) (discussing the legislative innovations that allowed for the passage of a controversial tax cut in 
George W. Bush’s administration). Authors have also addressed the modern day realities of the 
modern congressional process from the statutory interpretation perspective. See Lisa Bressman & 
Abbe Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, 
Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 911 (2013) (“A study of drafting ‘reality’ has 
obvious significance for evaluating canons that are intended to reflect or affect Congress.”); Lisa 
Bressman & Abbe Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 762 (2014) (“Our own research is 
consistent with our respondent’s accounts of the increasingly unorthodox legislative process.”). 
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
32 Id. at § 5. 
33 For an exploration of expedited rescissions, see Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, and Andrew-Bruhl, 
Return of the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules 
and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 553-62 (2009). 
34 See Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 346 n.9 (providing a detailed list of fast track statutes 
and session laws). 
35 Other procedural mechanisms allow for a streamlined lawmaking process. Under unanimous 
consent agreements, amendments are restricted and debate is limited. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20668, HOW MEASURES ARE BROUGHT TO THE HOUSE FLOOR: A 
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Reconciliation allows bills to pass without being subject to filibusters or 
nongermane amendments.36 Originally created by the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974 (the “Budget Act”) as a modest means to reconcile the 
first budget resolution with the now eliminated second resolution, 
reconciliation has since evolved into a versatile tool to enact complex, 
controversial budget-related legislation such as large tax cuts and health 
care reform.37 Such legislation would not have passed without the 
reconciliation process because it lacked supermajority support.38 
Are veto bridges strong or weak devices in overcoming the status quo? In 
one sense, they are extremely effective since they have the ability to tear down 
strong veto gates that Congress has erected. They also help to coordinate 
congressional action. On the other hand, because legislative rules are not 
externally enforceable,39 their scope is often in flux. For instance, in 2001, 
Senate Republicans successfully enacted some of the country’s largest tax cuts 
in history through the reconciliation process.40 The Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) sunsetted the cuts so that they 
did not violate the “Byrd rule,” which prohibits reconciliation legislation from 
increasing deficits beyond the budget window period (a ten-year period, at the 
time of enactment).41 This procedure was controversial at the time since many 
 
BRIEF INTRODUCTION 5 (2012); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-548, THE 
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (2014). Under a closed 
rule in the House, there can be no amendments to a bill on the floor, and in recent years, the House 
has increasingly used such rules. See Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1398-1400 
(2010); Sabrina Siddiqui, House Republicans Adopted Record Number of Closed Rules in 2013, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/06/congress-closed-
rules_n_4546762.html [https://perma.cc/L7V7-MRWD] (“Republicans adopted 19 closed rules 
during the government shutdown in October, the most in a single week . . . .”). 
36 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(e)(2), Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 316 
(“Debate in the Senate on any reconciliation bill or resolution reported under subsection (c), and all 
amendments thereto and debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to 
not more than 20 hours.”); Anita Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The 
Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 590 (1998) (arguing that 
reconciliation does not significantly impel budgetary reform). 
37 See Krishnakumar, supra note 36, at 590. (“In recent years particularly, reconciliation has 
become the centerpiece of the congressional budget process . . . .”); Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra 
note 5, at 2122-39 (tracing the evolution of the reconciliation process). 
38 Because of the circumvention of the filibuster and the need to garner the votes of more 
moderate Senators, however, reconciliation tends to produce more extreme, and hence less stable, 
legislation. Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 5, at 2144-45. 
39 The judiciary views the interpretation, application, and enforcement of legislative rules as 
wholly within the congressional realm, unless fundamental rights or constitutional restraints are 
concerned. Kysar, supra note 33, at 553-62. 
40 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 370. 
41 Fitting the tax cuts within the budget window was the original impetus for the sunsets; the 
sunsets were shortened even further to lower revenue losses from the bill. See id., at 375-78. 
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saw reconciliation as a vehicle for deficit reduction.42 Reconciliation, however, 
was again used for tax cuts in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), which were also sunsetted to reduce the bill’s revenue 
losses.43 Collectively and commonly referred to as the “Bush tax cuts,” these 
were two of the largest tax cuts in American history.44 
Several years later when Democrats regained control of Congress, each 
house imposed points of order against reconciliation bills that increased the 
deficit, essentially foreclosing the use of reconciliation for unpaid-for tax 
cuts.45 The House then reversed itself again in 2011 when it changed hands to 
the Republicans and lifted the prohibition against deficit-increasing 
reconciliation measures. It instead implemented a rule against using 
reconciliation to increase net spending.46 In each instance, a simple majority 
in each house decided the current scope of reconciliation, exposing its 
boundaries as quite unstable.47 The general trend seems to be toward allowing 
reconciliation in a wide variety of contexts, including passing health reform48 
and, more recently, complex tax reform.49 
The flexibility of veto bridges is thus perhaps their greatest strength and 
greatest challenge. On the one hand, veto bridges are powerful instruments 
that are increasingly employed to overcome procedural hurdles. On the other 
hand, the contestability over their fluid boundaries makes their availability 
unpredictable and, at times, their deployment contentious. Their endogeneity 
also means they can be easily evaded and, as a constitutional matter, can be 
changed by a simple majority in one house. 
B. Prompting Legislation 
Prompting laws are a category of laws that are designed to induce 
Congress to act at a later date. Prompting legislation attempts to move 
Congress towards a particular substantive result through the threat of 
 
42 ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, PROCESS, POLICY 142-49 (3d. ed. 2007). 
43 Mark Abbott & Patrick Sullivan, Focus on Congress, 99 TAX NOTES 1357 (2003). 
44 Jonathan Weisman & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Eyes $300 Billion Tax Cut, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 5, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123111279694652423. 
45 H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 402-03 (2007); S. Con. Res. 21 § 203, 110th Cong. (submitted as 
amended on May 8, 2007). 
46 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d)(1) (2011). 
47 Each of these changes was made via the budget resolution, which is filibuster-proof. 
48 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
49 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C.). For an overview of some of the procedural tactics discussed by 
Republicans to fit the tax legislation through reconciliation, see Kysar, Budget Process, supra note 
5, at 61; see also David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the Budget Baseline, 157 
TAX NOTES 125, 129 (2017), which discusses how Republicans could use a “current policy” 
baseline approach to comply with the requirements of reconciliation. 
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undesirable outcomes. Sequestration and temporary legislation are the two 
primary subcategories of prompting legislation. 
1. Sequestration 
Sequestration is a process that is employed to reduce spending by 
cancelling certain budgetary programs within specified parameters. 
Sequestration places caps on programs and expenditures and removes any 
excess above such caps.50 The sequestered funds can ratably come from all of 
public spending or according to weighted formulas that advantage certain 
types of spending over others.51 
Congress first experimented with sequestration by adopting the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) in 1985.52 GRH was a response to 
the massive deficit increases that followed the enactment of the 1974 Budget 
Act.53 Specifically, GRH threatened to sequester spending that failed to 
meet annual deficit targets by automatically imposing an expenditure 
ceiling “across the board,” on both domestic and defense spending.54 In the 
end, GRH failed to accomplish its goal of deficit reduction. Lawmakers 
circumvented sequestration by engaging in budget gimmicks and shifting 
the deficit targets.55 
Eventually, lawmakers found GRH’s deficit targets and enforcement 
mechanisms unworkable in light of a recession that began in 1990.56 
Dissatisfied with GRH’s effectiveness, Congress turned to spending caps and 
offset requirements in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA).57 The 
BEA required that direct spending and revenue legislation be revenue neutral, 
 
50 KAREN SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42050, BUDGET ‘SEQUESTRATION’ AND 
SELECTED PROGRAM EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL RULES 2-3 (2012). 
51 Christopher D. Dodge, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011 
Are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 837 (2012). 
52 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), Title II of Pub. 
L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 1069-70. 
53 Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. 
REV. 595, 621 (1988). 
54 Id. at 631; see also STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET: 
FISCAL 1993, at 21 (1992) (noting that certain federal programs, such as Social Security and tax 
expenditures, were exempted from “across the board” sequestration). 
55 Dodge, supra note 51, at 850-51; Christina S. Ho, Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration 
and the Independent Payment Advisory Board Lock-In Status Quo Majority Advantage?, 50 TULSA 
L. REV. 695, 718-19 (2015) (describing how Congress “contracted around” GRH using 
“privileged reconciliation rules”). 
56 See Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget Rules: The U.S. Experience, 15 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV. 
57, 61 (2008) (“[T]he combination of declining target deficits and a recession that began in the 
summer of 1990 led to a budget crisis when policies producing very large deficit cuts would have 
been required to stay on the prescribed deficit path.”). 
57 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-575. 
 
2019] Dynamic Legislation 823 
and that any increases to the deficit be “paid for” through tax increases or 
spending decreases (collectively, these rules are known as pay-as-you-go or 
PAYGO rules).58 If, in total, such legislation increased the deficit during a 
congressional session, sequestration would take effect. 
The BEA rules expired in 2002, and they never triggered a sequester. As 
the nation’s fiscal outlook improved in the late nineties, Congress found ways 
to circumvent the sequester. For instance, in order to pay for the re-enactment 
of certain temporary tax expenditures59, Congress repealed a revenue-losing 
provision. Shortly thereafter, Congress reinstated that provision but without 
an offsetting revenue increase.60 Other evasion tactics, such as advance 
appropriations, timing delays for government obligations, emergency 
exceptions, and special directives allowed spending to escape the 
consequences of the rules.61 Statutory PAYGO rules, enforced through the 
threat of sequestration, were again reinstated in 2010.62 These rules have also 
never resulted in sequestration. 
The third phase of Congressional experimentation with sequestration 
occurred with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA).63 BCA directed 
Congress to enact $1.2 trillion in spending cuts and to cut discretionary 
programs by more than $1 trillion over a decade-long period. Sequestration 
was the penalty for Congress failing to achieve these goals, resulting in $1.2 
trillion of across-the-board cuts in domestic and defense spending.64 
Congress failed to meet the initial deadline of January 15, 2012 to pass the 
necessary spending cuts. Sequestration was thus triggered and scheduled to 
take effect at the beginning of January 2013 but was delayed by Congress until 
 
58 COLLENDER, supra note 54, at 26. 
59 Tax expenditures are defined as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax 
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide 
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012). They are labeled “expenditures” 
because they are economically equivalent to government spending. For a discussion of the 
increasingly divergent treatment of tax expenditures in economics and the law, see Linda Sugin, The 
Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax 
Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 787-92 (2013). See also Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX 
L. REV. 617, 645-46 (2016) (analyzing, in the taxpayer standing context, tax expenditures as tax law 
rather than economically equivalent direct spending programs). 
60 Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 
43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 866 (2002). 
61 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 
2004-2013, 114 (2003) (“To comply with the letter of the law while boosting discretionary 
spending above the statutory limits, lawmakers used a number of approaches—including 
advance appropriations, delays in making obligations and payments, emergency designations, 
and specific directives.”). 
62 Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8. 
63 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240. 
64 Dodge, supra note 51, at 837. 
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it began in March of that year.65 Sequestration will continue until Congress 
meets or repeals the deficit reducing directives of the BCA. 
2. Sunset Provisions 
Sunset provisions, or laws that expire by their own terms without further 
action by Congress, are another category of prompting legislation. 
Temporary legislation has long been a part of American history. The Framers 
advocated for the use of sunset provisions to overcome the stickiness of 
legislation on both deliberative and democratic grounds.66 Congress’s 
increasing use of it post-2000, especially in the tax area, has spurred recent 
interest in the subject by legal scholars.67 
Good government reform groups advocated for using comprehensive 
sunset provisions to reduce the capture of agencies by interest groups in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. Although their efforts never succeeded 
at the federal level, thirty-five states enacted sunset review of agencies and 
other governmental entities.68 This experiment by the states, however, was 
widely considered a failure since periodic review was costly but ineffective 
at dislodging interest groups.69 
Congress has regularly employed sunset provisions for legislation. 
Appropriations are made on an annual basis, and economic stimulus bills are 
also sometimes sunsetted.70 In the 1990’s, an anti-assault weapons act and the 
independent counsel statute enacted to investigate President Clinton’s 
 
65 SPAR, supra note 50, at 1. 
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the two-year restriction on 
military appropriations); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (arguing for the sunset of all 
laws, including the Constitution, after nineteen years). 
67 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 5; Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5; Jason Oh, Pivotal Politics 
of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055 (2015); Yin, supra note 5. The non-U.S. literature on 
sunset provisions has also grown in recent years. See generally FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE 
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION (2013) (suggesting 
that legislatures pass temporary legislation to reduce opposition from constituents, test new 
proposals, and delay decision-making to future legislatures); ANTONIOS KOUROUTAKIS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF SUNSET CLAUSES: AN HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS 
(2016) (arguing that sunset provisions have long-standing historical roots and constitutional value 
in terms of separation of powers); SOFIA RACHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND 
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2015) (arguing that sunset 
provisions are valuable in light of uncertainty surrounding new policies); Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, 
Temporary Legislation, Better Regulation, and Experimentalist Governance: An Empirical Study, 12 REG. 
& GOVERNANCE 192 (2018) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests temporary legislation is 
becoming increasingly common and may be a useful tool for policy termination). 
68 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309-10 (1969). 
69 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 354-55. 
70 Kamin, supra note 11, at 23. 
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transgressions both contained sunset provisions to win over opponents 
concerned about the controversial nature of the bills.71 The antiterrorism 
legislation known as the USA PATRIOT ACT also contained widespread 
sunset provisions in the face of libertarian objections.72 
In the tax context, Congress has re-enacted a package of temporary 
provisions, known as extenders, every year since the 1970s. The biggest 
extenders were made permanent in 2015, but several dozen remain.73 Many 
of these provisions were originally sunsetted in order to review their 
efficacy or to address transitory conditions,74 but Congress continued to 
sunset them year after year chiefly because it would have been too costly to 
make them permanent.75 As mentioned above, budget reasons were also the 
motivation behind the sunset provisions in the Bush tax cuts.76 Most 
recently, the 2017 tax bill sunsetted most of the provisions affecting 
individuals in order to comply with budget rules and pressures.77  
3. Prompting Legislation and the Status Quo Bias 
The track record of prompting legislation in overcoming the status quo 
bias is weak. The threat of sequestration under GRH proved too severe to 
be effective and thus was abandoned. The statutory PAYGO rules resulted 
only in congressional circumvention.78 The BCA sequester was intended to 
serve as motivation to construct a deficit reduction deal but instead now 
functions as the new status quo.79 
Both GRH and BCA attempted to spur legislative action and failed in 
doing so. Specifically, these acts sought to overcome negotiation breakdowns 
and collective action difficulties to implement legislation that would eliminate 
or reduce the deficit. Blame could be placed on the unrealistic goals they 
attempted to meet, but could these sequesters have been designed differently 
such that a compromise plan could have been achieved? 
 
71 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 356-57. 
72 Id. at 357. 
73 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF DIVISION Q 
OF AMENDMENT #2 TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2029 (2015). 
74 Id. at 358. 
75 David Kamin, Drawing the Line on Tax Extenders, HILL (Dec. 24, 2013), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/193904-drawing-the-line-on-tax-extenders 
[https://perma.cc/7QMK-CV2Q]. 
76 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
77 H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017). 
78 See Auerbach, supra note 56, at 62 (arguing that the PAYGO rules enacted by Congress were 
ineffective because Congress later evaded their requirements). 
79 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165, 1166 (2013). The 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 reduced the deficit by $23 billion, but this can hardly be seen as the 
grand compromise intended by BCA, which aimed to reduce the deficit by $1.2 trillion. 
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I would argue that sequesters fail unconditionally because of the near 
impossibility of designing the proper amount of cuts. On the one hand, 
sequestration has to be severe enough that lawmakers view the policy path of 
avoiding the sequester as more favorable. On the other hand, if sequestration 
is too severe, lawmakers will devise circumvention techniques or will simply 
repeal the law.80 The experience with GRH and BEA suggests these laws 
erred too far in the direction of severity and BCA’s  threat was not severe 
enough. It is hard at the outset to predict which side of the razor’s edge the 
sequester amount will fall. For instance, contemporaneous scholarship 
contended that the GRH sequesters might prove to be an insufficient threat.81 
Later, in the face of a recession, the sequester cuts were seen by lawmakers as 
decidedly too harsh.82 Because of these design difficulties, the use of 
sequesters to overcome the status quo bias will ultimately fail. 
Sunset provisions have a mixed record of prompting action. In one sense, 
Congress often acts at the sunset date. Congress has repeatedly revisited the 
package of extenders to renew them year after year and continually renews 
annual appropriations. It also moved to extend the Bush tax cuts and later 
to permanently enact a portion of them. 
Nonetheless, it is far from clear that sunset provisions do their job of 
enhancing the deliberative process as envisioned by their advocates.83 
Although Congress often acts at the sunset date, sunsets sometimes do little 
but give lawmakers an opportunity to evade budget rules and to extract rents 
from interest groups.84 In such cases, the renewals are similar in result to 
Congressional inaction since they are moving Congress no closer to its policy 
preferences. Perhaps more troubling is the arbitrariness of the sunset. Unlike 
the sequester or dynamic legislation, sunset provisions prompt Congress to 
act not when substantive goals have been met or when conditions have 
changed but only at a certain date, often chosen due to budget process 
pressures or the congressional calendar. As a result, sunset provisions are 
overly broad, threatening cessation of still-favorable laws.85 
Finally, as a categorical matter, prompting legislation, whether it be in 
the form of sunsets or sequesters, often fails to overturn the status quo bias 
because, by definition, Congress still has to act at the point of provocation. 
 
80 See STEVE SHEFFRIN, MARKETS AND MAJORITIES 241-42 (1996) (citing alleged failures of 
the political process in responding to severe sequestrations, in which legislatures circumvent the 
original restriction rather than solve the underlying problem). 
81 Raphael Thelwell, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Four Years Later: A Dangerous Illusion, 50 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 190, 196 (1990). 
82 See Auerbach, supra note 56, at 61; Dodge, supra note 51, at 853-54 (describing the “delicate 
balancing game” of setting the appropriate levels of annual deficit caps). 
83 Gersen, supra note 5, at 266; Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1041-46. 
84 See infra notes 182–214 and accompanying text. 
85 See CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 61-62 (criticizing sunset provisions on these grounds). 
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Although the chances that Congress does indeed act may be increased due 
to the unfavorable outcome it faces, a breakdown in negotiations, collective 
action difficulties, a constrained agenda, or other dynamics that contributed 
to the status quo bias initially may still be in place at that later time. 
Congress may, therefore, end up with a poorer policy outcome than if the 
prompting legislation did not exist. 
Prompting legislation also poses practical problems. The uncertainty they 
create disrupts the planning activities of public and private actors, increasing 
compliance costs and distorting investment decisions. We saw these problems 
acutely when parties were forced to plan around the sunsets of the Bush tax cuts.86 
C. Dynamic Legislation 
Dynamic legislation overcomes the status quo bias by adjusting policy 
outcomes in accordance with certain criteria, without further action by 
Congress.87 Dynamic legislation aims to conform law to evolving conditions 
in order to maintain a previously agreed upon policy. It thus differs from 
legislation that changes in response to arbitrary markers, like dates. 
Legislation might, for instance, be phased in by the calendar,88 but this 
 
86 An example illustrating the morbid humor of tax lawyers and economists involves the 
estate tax repeal, which was in effect for only one year. Many began to refer to the sunsetted 
law as the “Throw Momma from the Train Act of 2001,” after a well-known movie of that era. 
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Reckonings; Bad Heir Day, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2001), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/30/opinion/reckonings-bad-heir-day.html (offering up the name 
because of the possible incentives that arrive from having a law that greatly changes the amount an 
estate is taxed upon inheritance depending on when exactly the original owners passes away). 
87 Dynamic legislation could be characterized as a type of unorthodox lawmaking, akin to those 
types of legislation that do not follow "ordinary" frameworks and procedures. See SINCLAIR, supra 
note 30; Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox 
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015). 
88 Traditional phase-ins and “sunrise” legislation will present different dynamics. The 
primary difference is that the lawmaking body, using those instruments, is able to impose the 
consequences of lawmaking upon later generations without itself being affected, thereby presenting 
democracy concerns. See Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But 
Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003-04 (2015) 
(relaying such concerns in the context of sunrise laws while also exploring the ability of such 
mechanisms to function as democracy-enhancing veil of ignorance rules); see also Frank Fagan & 
Saul Levmore, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and Carbon Taxes, in THE 
TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 130, 143 (exploring the democratic deficiencies of 
sunrise laws). Dynamic legislation generally takes effect immediately and thus does not present 
these concerns as a categorical matter. The nontraditional phase-ins that I suggest in Part V are 
contingent upon actual events transpiring rather than the mere passage of time. Accordingly, their 
intent is not necessarily to delay imposition of costs and benefits so that they fall on a future 
generation, and democratic concerns should thus not be nearly as acute in that context. Indeed, 
Levmore generally carves out transition rules from the category of democratically suspect sunrise 
laws since these exist to ensure efficient and effective implementation rather than to shift benefits 
and/or burdens across generations. Id. at 140-41. 
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legislation would not be dynamic under my categorical framework. This is 
because it is not intended to preserve the policy bargain by adjusting to current 
circumstances but instead exists to shift costs and benefits into the future. 
It also should be noted that nearly all law contains some degree of dynamic 
features. For instance, under the Controlled Substances Act, different 
categories of drugs face different restrictions, and the DEA can petition for a 
drug’s addition or removal based on whether it meets the standards outlined in 
the statute—for instance, whether there is a currently accepted medical use for 
the substance.89 Although application of this standard will change over time, 
its dynamism arises primarily from an external body applying current facts to 
the law, rather than from the law updating itself without congressional action. 
It therefore would fall outside my definition of dynamic legislation. 
Relatedly, we could also conjecture that dynamic legislation will be 
more prevalent in the contexts of rules (as opposed to standards). 
Standards are inherently dynamic because they generate different results 
as circumstances change. For instance, the reasonable person standard of 
care in negligence law evolves with social, economic, and technological 
changes. Rules will be more likely to require a dynamic mechanism because 
they do not have this built-in flexibility.90 
One can press on the definition further, however, by asking what 
precisely “updating” means. Here, I do not mean updating that results from 
the application of a fixed concept to one’s particular circumstances but rather 
due to evolving and external inputs, like macroeconomic aggregates. For 
instance, the miscellaneous itemized deduction limitation in the tax code 
allows certain deductions only to the extent they exceed two percent of the 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. This is functionally equivalent to a rate 
increase on top earners. Although the computed limitation is dynamic in 
that it varies according to the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, the 
legislation itself is not updating in light of broader data—just the computed 
dollar amount from the exercise of the taxpayer’s individual circumstances 
at a given time. If the law made a rate increase to the top brackets contingent 
upon the Gini coefficient (a common measure of income distribution) 
exceeding a certain threshold, this would be an example of dynamic 
legislation since the law itself is updating based on ensuing macroeconomic 
data—i.e. the degree of income inequality at the time. 
To the extent it has been employed, dynamic legislation has been very 
successful at overcoming the status quo bias. Portions of the tax code, for 
 
89 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a) & 812(b) (2012). 
90 This would help explain why we see more dynamic legislation in those parts of the tax law 
that are rules-based, e.g. brackets and the amounts of deductions and exemptions. Thanks to 
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl for this point. 
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instance, automatically adjust to take into account inflation. These 
inflation-adjusted provisions include the rate brackets, the standard 
deduction, the personal exemption, the earned income credit, and the 
phase-out of itemized deductions and personal exemptions.91 Inflation 
indexing of the tax code began in 1981 after a period of high inflation, which 
moved taxpayers into higher brackets.92 Indexing became a way to protect 
against this type of unlegislated tax increase. 
Another prominent instance of indexing in the legal system is in the 
entitlement area. Social Security monthly benefits, as well as the annual 
upper limit on wages subject to the Social Security tax, are both indexed for 
inflation. Another aspect of computing these benefits—the “average indexed 
monthly earnings”—is indexed for societal wage growth during one’s career, 
up until the age of 60.93 Medicare also contains automatic adjustments. 
Medicare premiums for medical insurance and prescription drug insurance 
generally must cover twenty-five percent of the cost of the program and thus 
rise or fall with health care costs.94 Physician reimbursement in the Medicare 
system also used to automatically adjust to a fiscally sustainable path in 
accordance with a formula that took into account increases in doctors’ costs, 
enrollment, and real gross domestic product per capita.95 Unemployment 
insurance has a countercyclical feature built into it, which triggers additional 
benefits when a state’s unemployment level reaches a certain amount.96 
Commodities are another area in which Congress has used automatic 
provisions. In 2014, for instance, Congress enacted income support relief for 
farmers, called the Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage 
programs.97 These federal subsidies assist farmers when crop prices fall below 
a certain level, and the amount of benefits paid varies inversely with the 
average prices in a growing season. These programs are location-specific, 
using the yields and prices of commodities in particular counties.98 
 
91 Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. Inflation indexing is also used in the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA). The excess of premium growth over income growth is also a factor in calculating 
thresholds in the individual mandate, thus taking into account increases in health care costs. See, 
e.g., Rev. Proc. 2017-36, 2017-21 I.R.B. 1251 (calculating indexing adjustments for ACA provisions). 
92 Stephen J. Entin, Tax Indexing Turns 30, TAX FOUND. (March 11, 2015), 
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-indexing-turns-30 [https://perma.cc/T73X-HFYE]. 
93 DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 13 (2000). 
94 See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 11, at 35 (“Medicare has a significant automatic-adjustment 
trigger that raises or lowers premiums depending on the trajectory of health costs . . . .”). 
95 Id. at 34. Kamin also notes that Congress has overridden these limitations more often than 
not. Id. This method was repealed by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015. 
Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87, 89. 
96 See Kamin, supra note 5, at 171-72 (discussing the “automatic-adjustment mechanisms” of the 
federal unemployment insurance system). 
97 Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 §§ 1116 & 1117. 
98 Id. 
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The challenge of dynamic legislation is the up front costs in its design.99 
In order to devise successful dynamic legislation, Congress needs to study 
various conditions that might activate the subsequent policy change and how 
policy should respond to such conditions. There are, however, ways to 
ameliorate the design difficulties inherent in dynamic legislation through, for 
instance, the use of indexing. Indeed, we would expect dynamic legislation to 
be least costly to design when the conditions to which it is responding are 
easily quantifiable. I take up the question of design in more detail in my 
discussion of implementing dynamic legislation below.100 
One might ask however, if, in addition to posing design costs, dynamic 
legislation might also be more difficult to enact in the first place. The 
legislature must decide how future circumstances affect current policy, and 
it may be difficult to form a coalition behind this task.101 Leaving the course 
of the law unenumerated may be the only way to gain the requisite votes. 
In order to enact prompting legislation, on the other hand, Congress need 
only come to an agreement on what the law should not be.102 
Although this is a valid point, it is not necessarily the case. Instead, it 
might be that setting the course of legislation to sail on a particular course 
will garner increased support for the policy at issue. If there is consensus 
behind a policy, it is difficult to see why that policy preference should not be 
protected against fluctuating circumstances. Suppose, for instance, that a 
representative supports the current tax rate structure in part because it is 
favorable to his base—low and middle-income constituents. Inflation 
indexing that rate structure helps to ensure that current law continues that 
distribution of the tax burden by giving it the advantage of legislative inertia. 
Lawmakers might also favor dynamic legislation since it will adjust 
expectations in favor of the current policy. Rather than allowing changing 
conditions to steadily erode the law, dynamic legislation helps to bake 
expectations regarding anticipated benefits into the policy baseline. For 
instance, since social security benefits are currently indexed for inflation and for 
wage growth, slowing the rate of these increases to Social Security benefits is 
framed as a cut to the entitlement.103 This framing helps lawmakers who are in 
favor of entitlement protection. Overall it is difficult to conclude that dynamic 
 
99 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 22 & 25 (discussing the intensive information gathering and 
decisionmaking required of policymakers at the outset of both setting up triggers generally and 
of indexing specifically). 
100 See infra notes 218–222 and accompanying text. 
101 Shaviro, supra note 10, at 67-68. 
102 See David Kamin, Legislating Crisis, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 34, 41 
(making a similar point in the context of formulating default rules for crises). 
103 Shaviro, supra note 10, at 68. 
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legislation is inherently more controversial to enact than ordinary legislation and 
may, in some instances, facilitate agreement among lawmakers. 
It should also be noted that dynamic legislation cannot solve gridlock in 
every instance, and its success in overcoming the status quo bias may depend 
on the source of gridlock. For instance, if Congress cares about controlling 
policy but has little information about the future, it may choose to overcome 
the status quo bias through sunsets or other prompting legislation. If 
Congress wishes to control policy but has more information about the future, 
dynamic legislation will be a viable option. If Congress, on the other hand, 
wishes to relinquish control over policy, delegation to agencies (a 
noncongressional anti-status quo device discussed below104) will be more 
likely. We can summarize the conditions in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Conditions for Selection of Anti-Status Quo Devices 
 
 Congress has little 
information about 
 the future 
Congress has more 
information about  
the future 
Congress cares about 
controlling policy 
sunsetting or other 
prompting legislation 
dynamic legislation 
Congress does not care 
about controlling policy 
delegation to agency no clear prediction 
 
We might then ask what is the point in comparing the various devices if 
they accomplish different goals. Part of this project, however, argues that 
Congress uses prompting legislation too often, even when it has 
information.105 In that case, dynamic legislation might be a better option 
given its democratic advantages, and we might consider deploying the use of 
prompting legislation in narrower contexts, for instance confining temporary 
legislation to experimentation and emergencies. 
III. DEMOCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The anti-status quo devices have democratic consequences because they 
impact the agenda of future congresses, interest group activity, the budget 
process, and the ability of Congress to control delegation to the executive 
branch. This part explores these dynamics. 
 
104 See infra notes 106, 117, & 119 and accompanying text. 
105 For instance, in the recent 2017 tax legislation, Congress sunsetted many portions of the act 
in order to fit the bill through the budgetary constraints of reconciliation, not because it lacked 
information to continue the desired policies. 
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A. Interaction with the Administrative State 
Delegation to the administrative state is another way in which Congress 
overcomes the inertia bias in lawmaking106 and is perhaps the most examined 
anti-status quo device in the literature.107 Congress delegates gap-filling 
authority to agencies, which, in turn, update the body of rules over time. Straight 
delegation to agencies remains necessary when Congress cannot foresee 
problems that need to be addressed. But if Congress can predict such issues, or 
at least their outlines to a sufficient degree to guide the agency, the question 
thus becomes which of the aforementioned congressional tools can best leverage 
the resources of the administrative state while also minimizing its costs. Here, I 
contend that dynamic legislation has clear advantages over temporary 
legislation, which is also used to minimize agency delegation.108 
A primary cost of delegation to agencies is, of course, congressional 
relinquishment of substantial lawmaking authority to the executive 
branch.109 This shift of power poses constitutional concerns.110 It also creates 
legal and practical dilemmas as Congress attempts to offset this transfer of 
power through oversight hearings, the power of the purse, the creation of 
independent agencies, enhanced judicial review, and statutory reversal of 
agency action, among others.111 These mechanisms, however, only go so far 
in restoring congressional preferences over policy. They also may 
considerably delay the administrative process. 
These considerations are even more acute as the executive power has 
expanded in recent years.112 Why, though, does Congress reallocate its 
authority to the executive branch in the first place? One answer might be that 
Congress delegates broadly in times of policy agreement with the President. 
Many such delegations were enacted in the New Deal and Great Society eras, 
when congressional preferences converged with those of the President.113 The 
delegating statutes remain in effect, however, long after those preferences 
 
106 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L. J. 523, 533 (1992). 
107 See, e.g., id. (“[I]n the modern administrative state most ‘lawmaking’ is accomplished by 
agencies under the authority of statutory delegations.”). 
108 Here, I primarily compare dynamic legislation with temporary legislation, since sequesters 
and veto bridges are not used to minimize agency delegations. 
109 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 533. 
110 See, e.g., id. at 534-39 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine and outlining possible impacts 
of the shift of power). 
111 Id. at 539-40 (examining these compensatory mechanisms and evaluating some of their 
problems and impacts). 
112 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obama-
bypass-congress.html. 
113 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 539. 
 
2019] Dynamic Legislation 833 
diverge.114 As these delegations accumulate, Congress finds itself ceding more 
and more authority to the President. 
Pages and pages of scholarly work have been written to justify the rise of 
the regulatory state, including as a response to the complexity of the modern 
world, the relative expertise of the regulatory agencies, and the limited 
ability of Congress to act quickly to changing circumstances and 
information.115 Although these reasons may justify each individual 
delegation, when viewing the delegations in their entirety, we see a system 
that bestows upon the President a great deal of control.116 The risk of this 
choice is that the constitutional separation of powers no longer adequately 
safeguards against an overreaching President. Moreover, with the near 
demise of the nondelegation doctrine, the judicial branch is unlikely to 
prevent the ceding of too much legislative authority.117 Indeed, under 
Chevron deference, the judiciary may exacerbate the problem.118 It is instead 
up to Congress to police its legislative domain. 
Although repealing previous authorizations is unrealistic, Congress may 
wish to narrow future rulemaking discretion. The challenge for Congress is to 
retain its lawmaking jurisdiction while also crafting a legal apparatus that 
remains current. One statutory-based solution to this dilemma is to attach a 
sunset provision to a delegating statute.119 That way, the statute will not remain 
on the books long after congressional and executive preferences have deviated 
from one another. It will, however, be difficult for Congress to set the 
appropriate sunset length. At the outset, Congress will not be able to predict 
when that divergence will take place. Congress also has to act again in order to 
effectuate its continued preferences. Assuming Congress prefers continuation 
of the sunsetted policy more than reversion to the underlying permanent policy, 
as may often be the case,120 Congress will spend its limited time and resources 
on revisiting policy simply to keep the other branch in check. 
 
114 Id. 
115 See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 
(1981); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWER (1999); JAMES M. 
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938): JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND 
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). 
116 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 534. 
117 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canon, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (“It is often 
said that the nondelegation doctrine is dead.”). 
118 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative 
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 511-26 (1989) (criticizing Chevron deference as worsening the 
delegation problem by empowering the President, rather than Congress, as the “control center of 
domestic public policy making”). 
119 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 726-28 (2012) (exploring 
how sunset provisions can maintain separation of powers by “reset[ting] the legislative baseline”). 
120 See infra notes 155–163 and accompanying text. 
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Dynamic legislation would be a better solution to this institutional 
dilemma because it would cabin executive discretion while also allowing 
that discretion to evolve in light of changing circumstances.121 It would do 
so without necessarily slowing down the administrative process. For 
instance, Congress delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) the power to regulate “any air pollutant[s] . . . which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”122 The EPA’s 
implementation of this statute has been notoriously political, particularly 
with regard to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases implicated in 
climate change. One way to cabin the EPA’s regulatory (and deregulatory) 
power would be to delegate findings of certain current external indicia, like 
carbon consumption, atmospheric conditions, temperature changes, sea 
levels, and other carbon reduction efforts by developing nations. These 
findings could then be compiled to form an index, which, in turn, could 
automatically increase or decrease certain statutory requirements.123 
Dynamic legislation may also be a way to delegate in areas where 
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to do so. Jim Hines and Kyle 
Logue, for instance, have noted that the Department of the Treasury has 
little authority over substantive policy compared with other agencies and 
have criticized Congress’s unwillingness to delegate in the tax area.124 They 
thus suggest, among other ideas, that Congress should delegate the power 
to set tax rates in order to leverage agency expertise and nimbleness.125 
Their proposal is interesting, but it implicates important questions about 
whether Congress should delegate its power to tax given its unique 
constitutional role over taxation and the desirability of locating decisions 
over tax policy to a more accountable body.126 
We need not make conclusions as to the precise degree of desirable 
delegation. For our purposes, I explore this scenario only to point out that 
dynamic legislation gives Congress the option to ratchet delegation up or down, 
 
121 David Kamin makes a similar point but with regard to using automatic triggers that turn 
policy on and off, in conjunction with delegation. Kamin, supra note 11, at 29. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). 
123 Richard Lazarus has put forth a comparable proposal. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems 
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1228 (2009). 
124 James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235, 253 (2015). For 
a discussion of the strategic considerations that cause the executive branch to not heavily regulate in 
the tax area, see Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2017). 
125 Hines and Logue, supra note 124. 
126 Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and the House of Representatives 
specifically the power to originate revenue bills. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8. For background on the 
Origination Clause and Congress’s special constitutional role over tax policy, see generally Rebecca M. 
Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (2014), and 
Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2013). 
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if it so desires. In the tax context, for instance, Congress might design a law that 
affords some rate-setting discretion to the Treasury, Federal Reserve, or other 
body, but cabins that discretion through formulas or indices.127 In times of sharp 
unemployment rises or decreases, the rate-setting body could reduce or increase 
taxes, but only by a correlating percentage within a specified range. 
One important strategic advantage that dynamic legislation would have 
over straight agency delegation is its staying power. Congressional members 
may appreciate that policies set by dynamic legislation would not be subject 
to the whims of the current President. The stability that dynamic legislation 
provides would also be beneficial from a private planning perspective. Rather 
than question if federal policy will continue after a presidential transition, 
those affected by the policy would have more assurance in the government’s 
commitment to that policy. 
B. Entrenchment Concerns 
Due to the fact that anti-status quo devices impose consequences on later 
congresses, it becomes relevant to question whether they impermissibly entrench 
those subsequent bodies. Under democratic and constitutional principles, current 
governments cannot bind future governments.128 As a manifestation of this 
principle, governments must be able to repeal the laws of their predecessors so 
that each government can remain reactive to the preferences of its current 
constituents.129 The entrenchment principle “implicates the very reach of 
government power and the nature of democratic accountability.”130 Frustratingly, 
however, the parameters of entrenchment are ill-defined. 
In an attempt to formalize the concept, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
have defined entrenchment in its “de jure” sense as “the enactment of either 
statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent 
 
127 Hines and Logue themselves mention such a possibility—not as a response to these 
concerns, but as part of the new system’s design. They dismiss it for not affording enough discretion 
to the rate-setting body. Hines & Logue, supra note 124, at 263-64. 
128 See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773 (2003); see also Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits 
on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381-82, 
391-93 (1987) (tracing objections to legislative entrenchment to “the temporal nature of the 
legislature’s mandate from the citizenry” and American rejection of legislative supremacy); John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 
89 VA. L. REV. 385, 444 (2003) (objecting to entrenchments but not sunset provisions). 
129 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local 
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1665 (2002) (“When cashed out in 
terms of constitutional doctrine, the principle means that legislatures may not enact . . . statutes 
or rules that bind the exercise of legislative power, by a subsequent legislature, over the subject 
matter of the entrenching provision.”). 
130 Serkin, supra note 129, at 881. 
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legislative action in the same form.”131 Under this definition, none of the anti-
status quo devices discussed here entrench. Indeed, no legislative devices 
would truly entrench Congress (only the Constitution would, by requiring 
supermajorities for its amendment).132 
But if we expand the notion of entrenchment to include those acts that 
are not simply legally binding upon subsequent legislatures, as Posner and 
Vermeule use the term, but also those acts that functionally bind such 
legislatures, then entrenchment issues become more concerning. These 
occurrences are entrenchment in its “de facto” sense.133 It is important to note 
that de facto entrenchment will also capture permissible acts—indeed, it 
primarily captures such acts. Many actions taken by a current government, 
after all, will affect the decisions and decision-making capacity of future 
governments. For instance, all statutes are harder to repeal because of the 
status quo bias, yet they do not all impermissibly entrench.134 
1. Veto Bridges and Entrenchment 
The entrenchment qualities of veto bridges are complex. As legislative 
rules, each house has purview over them as a matter of constitutional law, and 
this is most likely the case even when enacted in statutory form.135 The House 
adopts a new set of rules, which is passed by a simple majority, at the start of 
each Congress.136 The Senate’s rules, by contrast, exist in perpetuity and 
contain the restriction that they only be changed by a two-thirds 
supermajority in Rule XXII.137 The supermajority requirement thus is 
sometimes said to entrench the Senate’s rules. 
The continuing body theory of the Senate, which is based on the fact that 
two-thirds of the Senate body continues from one term to the next, is invoked 
to justify this type of entrenchment since there is no future Senate to bind.138 
 
131 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1667; see also Adrian Vermeule, Superstatues, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Oct. 26, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/78604/superstatutes [https://perma.cc/WJ4P-6AN9] 
(introducing and explaining a distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” entrenchment). 
132 See Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 374 (“In our system, entrenched legislation is a rare 
creature, for it is almost universally regarded as impermissible.”). But see Posner & Vermeule, 
supra note 129, at 1673-93 (arguing against this view). 
133 Vermeule, supra note 131. 
134 Id. The decision to spend government funds now also denies later generations the 
opportunity to do so. Yet this would also not be considered impermissible. 
135 For a thorough analysis of Congress’s power over its rules vis-à-vis the other branches, see 
Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 359-70. 
136 JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30725, THE FIRST DAY OF A NEW 
CONGRESS: A GUIDE TO PROCEEDINGS ON THE HOUSE FLOOR 9-10 (2017). 
137 Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013), R. XXII at 15. 
138 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the ‘Continuing Body’ Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. 
REV. 1401, 1444-56 (2010). 
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Aaron Bruhl has argued, however, that the continuing body theory does not 
reflect the institutional reality of the Senate and that it is insufficient to justify 
the binding of the Senate against itself.139 Recent Senate practice supports 
Bruhl’s views. In 2011, the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) used 
the “nuclear option” to prevent Republicans from forcing votes on amendments 
after a bill was moved to final passage.140 In 2013, a simple majority, again under 
the leadership of Reid, invoked the nuclear option to end filibusters on 
executive branch nominees and judicial nominees other than to the Supreme 
Court.141 Republicans extended this precedent to Supreme Court nominees 
during the confirmation hearings of Justice Gorsuch in 2017.142 
Entrenchment with regard to legislative rules thus presents a mixed 
picture. There seems to be some support for the belief that Senate rules are 
entrenched, although in recent years, the fragility of the filibuster, as made 
evident in the changing boundaries of reconciliation143 and the executive 
appointment contexts, calls into question this view. Moreover, because each 
house can change legislative rules and because the rules generally are outside 
of judicial enforcement, the current legislative body maintains a great deal of 
liberty over their content. 
2. Prompting Legislation and Entrenchment 
Both main types of prompting legislation cause de facto entrenchment 
issues. This is because sequestration and sunsets require legislative action 
just to avoid the imposition of unfavorable policies. They thus have the 
potential to crowd out Congressional action on other policy choices. GRH 
was initially criticized as illegitimately entrenching the preferences of the 
enacting Congress.144 Paul Kahn argued that the Act contained an implicit 
restriction that any repeal be expressly stated.145 This is a somewhat 
 
139 Id. at 1408. 
140 Alexander Bolton, Reid Triggers ‘Nuclear Option’ to Change Senate Rules, End Repeat Filibusters, 
HILL (Oct. 7, 2011), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/186133-reid-triggers-nuclear-option-to-
change-senate-rules-and-prohibit-post-cloture-filibusters [https://perma.cc/U5BT-465Z]. 
141 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html 
(“Under the change, the Senate will be able to cut off debate on executive and judicial branch 
nominees with a simple majority rather than rounding up a supermajority of 60 votes . . . . .”). 
142 Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html. 
143 See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
144 See Paul Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 187-88 (1986) (“The kind of control of the legislative function that 
Gramm-Rudman intends can only be accomplished constitutionally through the amendment 
process, not by statute.”). 
145 Id. at 202 n.61. 
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implausible reading of the statute. To the contrary, sequestration, as 
illustrated by the many examples of Congress evading its consequences 
over the years, does not legally entrench. As Posner and Vermeule have 
written, the “brute fact, one that Kahn cannot quite get around, is that 
Gramm-Rudman did not entrench itself. A simple majority vote of any 
later Congress sufficed to raise the deficit caps or repeal them pro tanto, 
and in fact Congress has done just that on several occasions.”146 From a 
present-day perspective, sequestration is criticized for its inability to bind 
future congresses.147 
Kahn also argued that GRH violated de facto entrenchment in other ways. 
First, the substance of Congress’s future legislative decisions would be altered 
because of the command to examine them in light of the deficit. Second, “by 
changing the effect of legislative inertia,” GRH modified the course of 
legislative judgment since repeal can be blocked by a minority.148 But Posner 
and Vermeule are correct to say that these arguments can be lodged against all 
statutes.149 Kahn’s objection is based on the fact that GRH changed the status 
quo. Existing legislation, however, usually has some effect upon how current 
issues are framed, and it always must be repealed by an affirmative act. 
Another, more valid, entrenchment argument, however, could be made 
against the sequestration device. What Kahn, Posner, and Vermeule 
overlook is the burden of action that sequestration places upon Congress in 
order to avoid the occurrence of sequestration. It is not the fact that GRH 
altered the substance of Congress’s decisionmaking or that Congress had to 
mobilize to repeal it (which it, in fact, did). It is the affirmative actions that 
Congress must undertake to avoid sequestration, which burden its already 
crowded legislative agenda. 
By definition, sequestration is an undesirable outcome. It thus differs 
from ordinary legislation in that the status quo is less likely to reflect the 
current majority’s preferences (and therefore it is more entrenching). Under 
GRH and BCA, Congress had to either meet certain goals through deficit-
reducing legislation, engage in budgeting gimmicks, or repeal the legislation 
in order to avoid sequestration. Although deficit reduction may have been an 
important goal of the prior Congress, changing conditions may make this no 
longer the case, as was true in the latter years of GRH. Penalizing Congress 
 
146 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1696. 
147 See Dodge, supra note 51, at 855 (“The GRH lacked any mechanism that would stop future 
Congresses from avoiding sequestration by amending the act to raise deficit caps or repeal the caps 
altogether.”); Ho, supra note 55, at 739 (“Any Member who wishes to act in contravention of the 
BCA need only muster the support in Congress to waive, suspend, change the parameters, or even 
change the critical statutory language . . . in order to achieve their policy objective.”). 
148 Kahn, supra note 144, at 205. 
149 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1696-97. 
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for failing to address deficit reduction at a time when it no longer cares about 
it arguably entrenches the priorities of the enacting Congress. 
On the other hand, if deficit reduction is still a priority of the subsequent 
Congress, it could be reasoned that the sequestration threat allows the current 
majority to actualize that goal. As I have argued above, however, sequestration 
is a poor mechanism to prompt deficit reduction because the sequestration 
levels are either too harsh or too lenient.150 When compromise is difficult, as 
was the case under BCA, the sequestration threat may not prove harsh enough 
to overcome the political costs in achieving deficit reduction. 
Scholars have also criticized sunset provisions for creating entrenchment 
concerns.151 A typical entrenchment provision, according to Posner and 
Vermeule, “forbids the later legislature to prevent a statute from remaining in 
force by an affirmative repeal, while the sunset clause forbids the later 
legislature to allow a statue to remain in force by declining to repeal.”152 
Essentially, sunset provisions require Congress to act in order to keep a law 
on the books that they may not wish to terminate. Indeed, one study has 
found that committee chairs regard temporary legislation as encroaching 
upon the time they could devote to other matters.153 
The counter-argument to this claim is that permanent legislation also 
entrenches since future congresses must expend precious legislative resources to 
repeal or amend existing legislation. It could be argued that current lawmakers 
are respecting the prerogatives of future lawmakers when they choose to sunset 
a law by freeing them from the benefits and burdens of the law.154 
There is a plausible response to this—that temporary legislation causes 
more entrenchment problems than permanent legislation because a future 
 
150 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
151 See, e.g., Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1056-59 (“To the extent that sunset 
provisions allow an earlier legislature to terminate a statute, causing the law to revert to its prior 
incarnation (when the legislature at that time may not wish it to terminate), sunset provisions can fairly 
be characterized as entrenchment mechanisms.”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1676-77 
(arguing that sunsets and legislative entrenchment are constitutionally indistinguishable); Yin, supra 
note 5, at 248-52 (arguing that sunset provisions may “potentially present[] a ‘deader hand’ 
problem”). But see Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 536 (2008) 
(arguing that sunset clauses enhance efficiency by making the reversibility of policy choices easier, 
hence distinguishing them from entrenchment devices); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at 
444 (contrasting sunset provisions from entrenching provisions on the grounds that “[s]unset 
provisions raise none of the special problems of public choice, aberrational majorities, partisanship, 
or imperfect psychological heuristics,” but noting that “an excessive use of sunset provisions might 
impose undue costs on future legislatures”). 
152 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1676. 
153 See Christine DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hearings, 
45 W. POL. Q. 971, 978 (1992) (finding that almost 56% of committee chairs felt that the 
“reauthorization imperative” raised by expiring temporary legislation detracted from time that 
could be devoted to other matters). 
154 See Fagan & Levmore, supra note 88, at 142-43 (setting forth this view and critiques of it). 
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majority will wish for the continuation of policies rather than repeal. This is 
because lawmakers will likely prefer the policies of the immediately prior 
Congress rather than those from several congresses back. The sunset provision 
essentially restores the law to an older, ostensibly less desirable policy.155 
The politics surrounding EGTRRA are an illustration of the hypothesis that 
older policy tends to be further removed from the current preferences of the 
median voter. EGTRRA raised the estate tax exclusions, in phased-in increases, 
from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009.156 The estate tax was completely 
repealed in 2010,157 but this repeal was sunsetted after just one year,158 at which 
point the estate tax exclusion would return to the 2000 level of $675,000. Instead 
of letting the sunset take effect, Congress set the exclusion amount at $5 million 
per year.159 Because this high exemption meant that only .06% of estates were 
subject to the estate tax,160 this policy decision represents an outcome that is 
much closer in ideology to total repeal than the $675,000 exemption amount, 
which reached 2.16% of estates when it was in effect in 2000.161 
The entrenchment concerns of sunsets hinge on whether the policy 
preferences of the directly prior generation of lawmakers are superior to the 
ones of further distant generations. If this is the case, then the lawmakers’ 
need to renew or make permanent the legislation potentially “detracts from 
the ability of the new legislature to set its own agenda” as compared to a world 
where the lawmakers had to do nothing to keep the preferable policies in 
place.162 This is an empirical question that is difficult to answer affirmatively, 
but it seems likely considering that sunsets are often employed precisely 
because the threat of reversion to the prior policy is undesirable. Moreover, 
the public may have grown accustomed to the benefits of the sunsetted 
legislation because of endowment effects. If this is the case, then letting the 
sunsetted provision lapse will be an undesirable policy outcome. 
Still, sunset provisions could be said to reduce entrenchment concerns by 
creating more opportunities for the future majority to let lapse the policies 
of the enacting Congress and also because it provides a legislative vehicle to 
which a future Congress may attach its own agenda items.163 As compared 
with permanent legislation, however, the entrenchment qualities of 
 
155 See Yin, supra note 5, at 248-52. 
156 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2006). 
157 26 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012). 
158 See 26 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006) (Effective and Termination Dates of 2001 Amendment) 
(providing that specified 2001 amendments to the Tax Code would not apply after December 31, 2010). 
159 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2012). 
160 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, HISTORY, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF 
THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 25 (2015). 
161 Id. 
162 Yin, supra note 5, at 251. 
163 Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1060. 
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temporary legislation seem less justifiable. By requiring affirmative repeal, 
permanent legislation, after all, signals to the public that the government’s 
commitments and policies are relatively stable. The entrenchment features of 
permanent legislation thus can be said to have benefits and may even be 
essential to implementation of the current majority’s preferences. Overall, it 
cannot be stated with certainty that temporary legislation produces more 
entrenchment concerns than permanent legislation, although it seems likely 
to be the case. The entrenchment it does produce, however, lacks 
independent, normative justification. 
3. Dynamic Legislation and Entrenchment 
Scholars have expressed entrenchment concerns with regard to dynamic 
legislation, but overall dynamic legislation fares well in this category.164 In 
their article arguing against the entrenchment of legislation, Professors John 
C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky contend that the dangers of 
entrenchment outweigh the stability advantages it fosters. For instance, 
temporary majorities may entrench their radical policies; entrenched policies 
cannot adapt to changing voting preferences, socio-economic conditions, or 
available budgetary resources; and errors may not be corrected.165 
Yet, dynamic legislation is designed precisely to combat many of these 
problems. For instance, dynamic legislation can be used to fluctuate with 
available funds or socio-economic indicators. As a result, dynamic legislation 
is intended to dovetail with consensus rather than hamper it. Although such 
legislation may admittedly not function as intended, the ability to repeal it 
should largely combat the dangers identified by Roberts and Chemerinsky. 
In some circumstances, dynamic legislation may largely track vacillations 
in legislative preferences or other conditions but not do so perfectly. In this 
situation, it may be the case that dynamic legislation actually discourages the 
legislature from updating policy. This arguably occurs because, due to the 
law’s automatic updates, the deviation between the status quo and legislative 
preferences may not be enough to incite Congress to action.166 
 
164 Kamin touches upon entrenchment and concludes that indexing, one type of dynamic 
legislation, presents entrenchment concerns. Kamin, supra note 11, at 24. In a later piece, Kamin is 
less pessimistic with regard to dynamic legislation, concluding that all legislative devices “involve 
entrenchment of one sort or another.” Kamin, supra note 5, at 171. 
165  Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 128, at 1809-13. 
166 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 26 (“Even as the mechanisms make policy more responsive in 
terms of the specific information measured and the specific response triggered, it could make the 
political system as a whole less responsive in other ways.”). 
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One way to think about whether legislative action is likely to occur is to 
model the preferences of the relative actors.167 For instance, assume the status 
quo or current top tax rate is 25%. In our hypothetical, the preferences of the 
relevant pivotal players have, however, shifted leftward due to increased 
inequality in society. For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume that both the median 
voter in the Senate and in the House prefer a tax rate of 35% while the 
President prefers a rate of 40%. Further assume for simplicity’s sake that any 
legislation will be implemented through the reconciliation process, which 
cannot be filibustered, thus rendering the preferences of the 60th Senator 
irrelevant to the model. This dynamic can be illustrated as in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Zones of Legislative Action and Inaction 
 
SQ=status quo or current policy 
H=preference of the median voter in the House 
S=preference of the median voter in the Senate 
P=preference of the President 
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In the context of ordinary legislation, if a rate between the preferences 
of the pivotal voters is proposed—between 35% and 40%—legislative 
inaction will occur since Congress will not go along with a higher rate even 
though the President would.168 If the proposed rate falls below 35% and 
above 25%, however, the interests of the House, Senate, and President are 
aligned to pass legislation raising the rate. 
The danger with dynamic legislation, some may argue, is that automatic 
updating brings the status quo closer to the policy preferences of the relevant 
actors. Say, for instance, that the tax rate has been indexed for inequality by 
keying it to the Gini coefficient. Because of a rise in the Gini coefficient, the 
current tax rate is now 36%. This results in no legislative action. Is this 
entrenching? Surely not, because the current preferences of the legislative actors 
are reflected in the status quo. In this scenario, there are few, if any, policy 
 
167 The model herein is similar to that used by Eskridge and Ferejohn, among others. Eskridge 
& Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 529-32. 
168 KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 38 (1998). 
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choices left outside of the status quo that would appease the Senate, House, and 
President. A lower rate would prove unfavorable to the President, and a higher 
rate would prove unfavorable to the median voter in the Senate and House. 
What if, however, the tax rate only rises to 34%? The model would predict 
legislative action to occur. If so, entrenchment is also not a problem since the 
current government will update the legislation according to its wishes—to 35%. 
There is, however, an argument that the 34% rate is close enough to the wishes 
of the legislature that it fails to act. Perhaps inaction occurs because the 
legislative agenda is so crowded or relations between parties are so strained that 
only the most noxious policies can be overturned. A world without dynamic 
legislation, as discussed above, would produce a status quo rate of 25%, which 
may be low enough to spur legislative action. Thus, so the argument goes, 
dynamic legislation has the potential to entrench old preferences because it 
tracks preferences as they evolve, just not well enough.169 
This argument may have some validity, but as illustrated, its application is 
narrow. For there to be an arguable entrenchment problem, the automatic 
mechanism would have to produce a policy outcome that is just inside of the zone 
of legislative action, on the boundary between action and inaction. Outside the 
zone of legislative action results in no entrenchment problem and deeper inside 
the zone (rightward in the above chart) is sufficient to overturn the status quo. 
Additionally, legislative inaction may occur regardless of where on the 
chart the status quo lies. If a crowded legislative agenda is the primary factor 
behind legislative inaction, the saliency of the lower rate may spur policy 
change. But the same collective action or negotiation difficulties may result 
in gridlock no matter if the rate is 25% or 34%. Entrenchment may, therefore, 
be a factor in only a subset of those already narrow cases where the policy 
outcome lies just inside the zone of legislative action. 
On balance, it seems that dynamic legislation offers an opportunity to 
combat entrenchment by relieving the legislature from having to constantly 
refresh policies in light of changing conditions. This allows the legislature to 
focus its energies on implementing other preferences. If dynamic legislation 
is well designed, it is more likely to update legislation in accordance with 
current preferences rather than entrenching policies by adjusting them to an 
undesirable, but tolerable level. 
In short, as with all types of legislation, dynamic legislation has features 
that could contribute to the entrenchment of the current legislature’s 
preferences, but these are less objectionable than those presented by 
prompting legislation. A related critique may be that dynamic legislation 
reduces the opportunity for Congress to deliberate because of its ability to 
 
169 Part of this advantage is definitional. I am assuming that dynamic legislation is and can be 
designed to track policy preferences. 
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track policy preferences over time. Deliberation, however, is not costless. If 
Congress had to deliberate every extant law on the books, this overly robust 
process would harm democratic values since the current Congress would not 
have the space to create its own agenda. Dynamic legislation thus represents 
a tradeoff between deliberation for deliberations’ sake and efficiently tracking 
policy preferences. The compromise is likely superior from the perspective 
of later congresses who are freed from woodenly revisiting the preferences of 
prior congresses with whom they are in agreement. 
C. Political Economy and Fairness Concerns 
Aside from entrenchment, the anti-status quo devices might arguably 
present other democratic concerns, like those relating to interest group 
activity, fairness, and democratic accountability. These are explored below. 
1. Veto Bridges and Fairness 
Veto bridges are part of the body of rules Congress uses to govern itself. 
In theory, they should be neutral and procedural. In practice, however, they 
have been manipulated by a simple majority and hence suffer from 
accusations of unfairness. This manipulation occurs because veto bridges are 
powerful tools in advancing a partisan agenda. For instance, as discussed 
above, the reconciliation process has seesawed between applying only to tax 
cuts and only to tax increases.170 These tactics widen the partisan divide by 
sowing distrust among the parties, thereby potentially worsening, rather than 
easing, general legislative gridlock over the long haul.171 
Congressional rules, like all rules of procedure, invoke the Rawlsian 
concept of the “veil of ignorance.”172 Veil of ignorance rules are adopted 
without the knowledge of who will profit or lose from them, in something 
akin to an “original position” and are thus said to represent a fair outcome.173 
 
170 See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
171 See, e.g., JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT: STALEMATE IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 5 (1995) (identifying increased party polarization as a contributing factor to gridlock). 
172 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971) (positing that principles of 
justice should be chosen behind a “veil of ignorance” such that “no one knows . . . his fortune in 
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like”); 
Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 718 
(2005) (making the comparison in the context of “framework legislation” or the laws that govern 
congressional procedure); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE 
L.J. 399, 399 (2001) (identifying certain constitutional provisions, primarily in the congressional 
arena, as veil of ignorance rules). 
173 See RAWLS, supra note 172, at 136–42 (using this original position, whereby those in charge 
of formulating societal rules know nothing about their position in society, as a tool to eradicate the 
distorting effects of knowledge of existing beneficiaries). 
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Because congressional rules are meant merely to define the rules of the 
lawmaking game, in theory, their procedural focus should prevent them from 
allocating costs and benefits to parties that are identifiable at the outset. 
In practice, however, veto bridges deviate from veil of ignorance rules and 
the qualities that impart fairness. A rule drafted in general terms allows 
lawmakers to be ignorant of who falls within its scope, thus leading to unbiased 
policymaking.174 In reality, the rules operate in specificity, thus conferring 
benefits and burdens on specific groups. For instance, the reconciliation 
process benefitted tax cutters, typically conservatives, when its scope was 
redefined to encompass revenue-decreasing legislation and to exclude tax 
increases. Parallel experiences with PAYGO rules, whereby the dominant 
party has crafted specific exemptions from their scope, further exemplify this 
tendency to tamper with a rule’s otherwise general scope.175 
Moreover, even where rules are drafted generally, that generality may be 
under-enforced due to the endogeneity of the legislative rules. Thus, a 
simple majority may interpret rules in their favor without recourse. For 
instance, even prior to legislative rules expressly allowing reconciliation to 
reach tax cuts, Republicans obtained this result through interpreting the 
existing reconciliation language to allow temporary tax cuts.176 The 
procedural advantages offered by reconciliation are simply too great, 
tempting the majority to engage in one-sided applications of its rules. 
Durability further enhances the Rawlsian veil effect of a rule;177 here, 
too, veto bridges fall short. A rule’s longevity obscures its long-term effects, 
thus forcing the lawmaker to draft a rule fairly, without knowing whether 
she reaps the statute’s benefits or bears its burdens. The ruling party, 
however, routinely alters veto bridges to its benefit because there is so much 
at stake.178 Unlike the arduous path to constitutional amendment, or even 
 
174 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 412 (“The generality requirement . . . is said to produce veil 
effects that deprive decisionmakers of the information needed to pursue selfish or partial interests.”). 
175 Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1033-35. 
176 See SCHICK, supra note 42. 
177 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 415-16 (discussing the relationship between durability and 
fairness in the constitutional context). 
178 This observation comports with the work of Sarah Binder and Douglas Dion, who conclude 
that partisan calculus is a large driver of procedural change. SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY 
RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 9-12 (1997); 
DOUGLAS DION, TURNING THE LEGISLATIVE THUMBSCREW: MINORITY RIGHTS AND 
PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 14-18 (1997); see also Andrew-Bruhl, Return of 
the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30, at 482-83 (discussing the partisan theory in the context of expedited 
rescission). Binder and Douglas also do not find support for the idea that majorities refrain from 
inflicting harm upon minorities for fear that the reciprocity of the rules will punish them when they 
are no longer in the majority. See BINDER, supra, at 9-10, 203-05; DION, supra, at 17, 248-50; see also 
Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30, at 484 (agreeing with Binder and Douglas 
in the context of expedited rescission). 
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to statutory revision, a simple majority of just one house can alter legislative 
rules, thus reducing their staying power. Recent developments in the Senate 
regarding the nuclear option and the reconciliation process make 
majoritarian rule changes much less controversial than in the past. 
Accordingly, legislative rules are now more volatile. 
In summary, the lack of generality and durability in veto bridges means 
that they are often perceived as unfairly advantaging one party over the other, 
which is what procedural rules are designed to guard against.179 Instead of 
being created behind a veil of ignorance where winners now could just as 
easily become losers later, the fluid boundaries of veto bridges and their 
temporality mean that their beneficiaries and benefactors are largely 
identifiable at the outset. The rules are unlikely to be applied equally to 
future, unknown legislative participants and thus can be easily manipulated. 
The perception of gamesmanship in the context of reconciliation, has created 
distrust among congressional members, causing greater and greater 
aggressiveness in the process by the ruling party.180 Arguably, the distrust 
sewn by this discord has destabilized Senate rules generally. 
2. The Political Economy of Prompting Legislation 
In prior work, I have discussed the political economy effects of one 
category of prompting legislation—sunset provisions—and concluded that, 
categorically, such provisions increase rents from interest groups.181 
Specifically, I argued that sunset provisions allow legislators to extract such 
rents at the sunset date by threatening an unfavorable outcome.182 This 
phenomenon helps to explain why legislators and lobbyists enact temporary 
legislation and continue to reenact it time and time again. 
One critique of this assessment is that lawmakers and lobbyists can also 
extract rents by threatening to repeal or amend nonsunsetted, or permanent, 
legislation.183 Yet the threat of letting a sunset expire is greater because it 
requires no action as opposed to the complex machinery necessary to repeal 
or amend a law. Although temporary legislation undoubtedly transfers fewer 
 
179 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 412; see also Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 379-80 
(analogizing procedural rules to constitutional rules as a means to protect against the whims of the 
ruling majority). 
180 See Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 5, at 2154-55; supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text. 
181 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1051; see also Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra 
note 5, at 393-94. 
182 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 394. Rent extraction is defined by threats of political 
disfavor rather than promises of rewards. See FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: 
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 75 (1997) (identifying and 
explaining the rent extraction phenomenon). 
183 See Yin, supra note 5, at 243-44. 
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benefits to interest groups than permanent legislation because of its limited 
duration, campaign finance laws encourage lawmakers to advocate for 
temporary legislation by limiting the amount of contributions a lawmaker can 
receive in a given time period.184 Because the demand for legislative product 
is likely limited within the legislator’s particular constituency, each lawmaker 
will be motivated to preserve future demand by sunsetting legislation in the 
current term.185 These phenomena may explain why, for instance, there were 
only forty-four expiring tax provisions prior to the McCain–Feingold 
campaign finance reform law, and over two hundred such provisions 
afterwards.186 As campaign finance limits became more prevalent, so did the 
legislators need to spread out rent extraction over time. Lobbyists may also 
be complicit in this arrangement. They are incentivized to prefer sunsets, 
which assure them continued employment.187 
Additionally, interest groups may value recurrent temporary deals more 
than permanent legislation for various reasons. Interest groups avoid 
lobbying disclosure requirements, and hence public scrutiny, if their 
contributions are staggered instead of bunched in a particular time period. 
Relative valuation is also important; if interest groups have a higher cost of 
capital than lawmakers, as may be the case with many business interests, the 
parties are more likely to decide upon temporary legislation.188 Moreover, 
 
184 This effect may be muted in a post-Citizens United world. Daniel Hemel has posited 
that Congress’s recent move to make permanent certain temporary tax breaks, known as tax 
extenders, can be explained, at least in part, by the curtailment of campaign finance restrictions 
in Citizens United. Daniel Hemel, The Twilight of Tax Sunsets, UNIV. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG 
(Dec. 29, 2015), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/the-twilight-of-tax-sunsets.html 
[https://perma.cc/E633-92XR]. Nonetheless, campaign finance laws still limit the amounts 
individuals and groups can give to candidates, PACs, and party committees and thus should still 
work, at the margins, to advantage temporary over permanent legislation. I would conjecture that 
the move to permanency reflects Congress’s frustration at having to revisit the same policy matters, 
exhausting the attention they can pay to other legislative priorities. Over time, this dynamic 
worsens. Much of the 2017 tax legislature was sunsetted, and we can expect Congress to enact new 
temporary provisions to meet budgetary pressures. 
185 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1053 (noting that because of campaign finance 
laws, lawmakers can capture more benefits from repeated contributions under temporary legislation). 
186 Hemel, supra note 184. 
187 This is supported by anecdotal evidence from a lobbyist, who said the following: 
Who wants to lose a client? . . . With [temporary tax provisions], you know you always 
have someone who will help pay the mortgage. You go to the client, tell them you’re 
going to fight like hell for permanent extension, but tell them it’s a real long shot and 
that we’ll really be lucky just to get a six-month extension. Then you go to the Hill 
and strike a deal for a one-year extension. In the end, your client thinks you’re a hero 
and they sign on for another year. 
Pat Jones, New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, 66 TAX NOTES 1587, 1587 (1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 Cf. Hemel, supra note 184 (making a similar point about relative discount rates). 
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corporations may pay more for temporary deals since agency costs may lead 
shareholders to overemphasize short term earnings as a proxy for evaluating 
managerial performance.189 The availability of temporary legislation in these 
contexts will increase interest group activity at the margins, as compared to a 
world without temporary legislation. 
Finally, permanent legislation carries real risks, which decreases its value 
to the interest group. For instance, a legislator may breach his or her duties 
to the interest group because of competing demands or opportunities; the 
legislator may lose office, or the legislative coalition may change.190 Although 
an interest group may prefer durability in the law, it is unlikely that 
lawmakers will be able to ensure the law’s survival beyond a short-term 
horizon in many contexts.191 Under these circumstances, the interest group 
will not pay for the long-term benefit or will discount it by the probability it 
will not survive. In fact, sunsets might arise precisely because one group 
expects political instability in the future period that will upset any agreed 
upon bargain. The interest group itself may also be unable to use future 
benefits due to changing circumstances or identity.192 The interest group may 
thus prefer a series of temporary deals rather than a permanent one. 
This view of the political economy explains the continual renewal of 
sunsetted tax provisions; lawmakers and lobbyists benefit from repeated 
extraction of rents, and interest groups pay up because they may value the 
temporality of certain benefits. Sequestration functions in a manner similar 
to sunsets; lawmakers use the looming threat of sequestration to continually 
extract benefits from interest groups. Rather than facing arbitrary 
reallocation of federal resources, sequestration spurs interest groups into 
action, who advocate for maintaining their particular benefit. In both cases, 
 
189 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards 
Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1102-03 (1990) (criticizing corporate management’s increase 
in short-term earnings in order to appease shareholders who “lack perfect information”). 
190 See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and 
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 945-52 (1987) (describing this 
phenomenon in the tax context). 
191 Saul Levmore discusses how laws are more valuable to interest groups if they are more 
durable. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a series of short-term deals will not be 
preferable for the reasons mentioned above. Levmore also readily acknowledges that, in fact, 
lawmakers cannot commit to the durability of most law, with the exception of certain spending 
projects and programs “that are less vulnerable to the winds of change.” Saul Levmore, Interest Groups 
and the Durability of Law, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 171, 194. 
192 John Macey had made a similar point: interest groups should favor narrowly tailored 
legislation over broad constitutional provisions because the future beneficiaries of the latter are 
unclear. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 246-47 (1986) (illustrating that 
“even special interest groups that might benefit from some specific, discrete legislative wealth 
transfers are likely to object to general constitutional provisions” (emphasis added)). 
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prompting legislation threatens to disrupt the existing allocation of 
government resources and hence is ripe for rent extraction opportunities. It 
provides, in the classic phrasing of Fred McChesney, “money for nothing.”193 
3. The Political Economy of Dynamic Legislation 
Dynamic legislation typically does not afford the same rent-extraction 
opportunities as prompting legislation. By definition, prompting legislation 
overturns the legislative status quo bias through the threat of undesirable 
outcomes, thus lending itself perfectly to rent extraction. Dynamic 
legislation, on the other hand, overcomes the status quo bias through 
spontaneous adjustments. If an interest group benefits from the dynamic 
legislation, a lawmaker could threaten its repeal or modification, but this 
threat would be no more forceful than with ordinary legislation, requiring 
navigation through the entire lawmaking apparatus. 
Another way in which dynamic legislation is undesirable to interest groups 
is its relative lack of specificity concerning its future beneficiaries. Prompting 
legislation contains triggering events that likely advantage one party over the 
other. Sequestration, for instance, penalizes those who wish to maintain current 
spending levels. Sunsetted tax cuts, on the other hand, penalize those who want 
to maintain current tax cuts. The mechanism in prompting legislation of 
undesirable outcomes means it is likely known which interests will be harmed. 
Prompting legislation is designed to punish particular groups. 
Dynamic legislation, in contrast, does not require subsequent 
congressional action and thus reduces the opportunities for lawmakers to 
extract rents. Indeed, the goal of dynamic legislation is to create an evolving 
set of laws that minimize the need for later congressional action. In other 
words, dynamic legislation attempts to preserve the pre-existing political 
bargain and shifts the burden of action onto advocates of change. This feature 
makes it more resilient to rent extraction. 
By way of example, consider inflation and its effect on our tax system. The 
tax code calculates income using a progressive rate schedule by applying 
increased tax rates to brackets denominated in dollar amounts. So, for instance, 
assuming there is a tax bracket of 10% on the first $10,000 of income, and 25% 
on the rest, a taxpayer with $20,000 of income will pay tax of $3,500. If, over 
time, these brackets are not adjusted for inflation, the tax burden will be larger 
than the year before, a phenomenon known as “bracket creep.”194 Eventually, 
 
193 MCCHESNEY, supra note 182; see also DIRE STRAITS, Money for Nothing, on BROTHERS IN 
ARMS (Vertigo 1988) (describing rock musicians as earning “[m]oney for nothin’”). 
194 DONALD W. KIEFER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 83-115, THE EFFECTS OF 
INDEXATION ON TAX REVENUES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INDIVIDUAL 
INCOME TAX SYSTEM 5 (1983). 
 
850 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 809 
the erosion of the brackets through inflation makes a rate cut politically 
necessary. Congress can then use this must-pass legislation as a vehicle to 
reallocate the tax burden to certain private parties.195 This dynamic bore out 
in practice, as Congress responded to bracket creep through discretionary tax 
cuts, which, in turn, gave lawmakers the opportunity to reward special 
interests.196 In the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, Congress addressed 
bracket creep by including automatic inflation adjustments of the tax brackets, 
as well as the personal exemption,197 and thus, through dynamic legislation, 
removed the discretion to threaten or reward interest groups.198 
Of course, it is possible that interest groups may be able to draft dynamic 
legislation keyed to indicators specific to their circumstances, thus ensuring 
that their benefits will be maintained down the line and in accordance with the 
group’s future needs. Compared to ordinary legislation, so the argument would 
go, this feature may be undesirable since, on balance, it may produce more deals 
between lawmakers and interest groups. For instance, Congress currently 
provides an excise tax exemption for wooden arrows designed for use by 
children that consist of all natural wood that measures 5/16 of an inch or less in 
diameter, and are not suitable for use with a bow that has a maximum draw 
weight of thirty pounds or more.199 Drafted narrowly to benefit a company 
called Rose City Archery, the precise nature of the legislation ensures its scope 
is that of the company and no other. Suppose, however, that the lawmakers 
drafted the law to update automatically, perhaps pegging the size of the tax 
relief inversely to the company’s market share of the industry. Such an 
arrangement may increase the value of the legislative deal to Rose City since it 
allocates the tax relief according to the company’s needs at a given time. 
Still, the ability to craft benefits that will follow the characteristics and 
requirements of an interest group over time is a narrow critique of dynamic 
 
195 Dynamic legislation can decrease special interest benefits in idiosyncratic ways. For instance, 
the standard deduction dilutes the value of the itemized deductions, such as the mortgage interest 
deduction, which benefits interest groups like the real estate industry. This is because taxpayers can 
claim the standard deduction without regard to their circumstances. Indexing the standard deduction 
for inflation, as is the case under current law, ensures that the standard deduction continues to dilute 
itemized deductions, perhaps at an increasing rate, thus harming the special interests that benefit from 
the itemized deductions. See Alan L. Feld, Silent Tax Changes: The Political Economy of Indexing for 
Inflation 16-17 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 15-35, 2015), 
https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2015/12/FeldA09212015paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WA2-2QMC] 
(noting that the standard deduction was 57.8% of the average itemized deductions in 2010 for AGIs 
between $40,000 and $50,000, compared to 50.2% in 1990 for the same AGI interval). 
196 See id. at 10 (stating that discretionary adjustments “allow for selective cuts in the rates”). 
197 See Lawrence M. Axelrod, Chain, Chain, Chain: Taxes and Chained CPI, 139 TAX 
NOTES 461, 461 (2013). 
198 See Feld, supra note 195, at 12 (arguing that automatic adjustments take away the power of 
legislators to “provide targeted benefits for supporters and friends”). 
199 26 U.S.C. § 4161(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
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legislation since many types of dynamic legislation will not present this 
result. In contrast, prompting legislation, by its very nature, tends to exploit 
interest groups due to its threats to the status quo. Additionally, dynamic 
legislation, even if drafted narrowly, also carries the significant risk that any 
particular interest group will eventually fall outside its scope (thereby 
increasing the cost of the legislation relative to its benefits) or, alternatively, 
that others will fall inside the scope (thereby benefitting its competitors). The 
evolutive character of dynamic legislation may mean that, compared with 
ordinary legislation, the legislative benefits are less valuable to interest groups. 
The time-limited nature of temporary legislation, in contrast, minimizes the 
risk that legislative benefits will go unused by the intended party. 
It could also be argued that dynamic legislation shields lawmakers from 
accountability since they do not have to act for the law to change.200 Thus, 
voters may unfairly attribute the policy changes of dynamic legislation to prior 
generations of lawmakers. The flipside of this argument, however, is that the 
failure to automatically adjust policy may allow lawmakers to skirt public 
judgment for the consequences of that failure. In other words, when compared 
with dynamic legislation, which generally preserves the distribution of costs 
and benefits through evolving circumstances, static legislation represents a 
deviation from that bargain for which lawmakers should be held responsible. 
For instance, not updating our progressive tax rate structure to reflect inflation 
would allow for the slow but steady increase of taxes without public notice. 
Moreover, this would impact most acutely taxpayers in the middle brackets, 
thereby undoing the status quo distribution of the tax burden.201 This 
difference in framing what constitutes a policy change means that static 
legislation, even more so than dynamic legislation, can be criticized for 
protecting current lawmakers against public accountability. 
D. Integrity of the Budget Process 
One often overlooked criterion for evaluating the democratic function of 
lawmaking tools is their interaction with the budget process. Budgeting is an 
essential aspect of the democratic process, allowing for expression of 
lawmakers’ decisions over government spending and investment.202 It ensures 
that information on long-term budget impacts and various policy trade-offs 
are made available to voters and lawmakers. It coordinates decisionmaking 
 
200 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 22 (arguing that, on balance, dynamic legislation shields 
current lawmakers from direct accountability). 
201 See Feld, supra note 195, at 11-12. 
202 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S 
COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 11 (1967); see also Block, supra note 60, at 899-904 (2002) 
(discussing the democracy-oriented goals of the budget process). 
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both within the current Congress and across different congresses. The budget 
rules assist Congress in abiding by their budgeting choices, through tools like 
PAYGO, spending caps, and other points of order.203 
Along the budgeting axis, dynamic legislation has a distinct advantage over 
prompting legislation because it does not require later action from Congress. 
In this manner, it limits the opportunity for Congress to defect from 
budgetary constraints it has previously imposed on itself. A bit of background 
on budget rules, and their application to temporary legislation, helps to 
understand why this feature of dynamic legislation is so important. 
1. Budgetary Games, Prompting Legislation, and Veto Bridges 
Gamesmanship plagues the budgetary system. This is because budget 
rules serve as very weak precommitment devices and can be avoided at a 
later point in time.204 Budget rules exist because lawmakers have a primary 
goal of budgetary responsibility when they are conceived, at Time 1, but 
lawmakers also know that, at the time of the rule’s application, Time 2, they 
will face pressures from their constituents to deliver costly legislative 
benefits. They thus collectively agree upon a set of rules that impose costs 
upon them when they deviate from the path of fiscal discipline. Yet unlike 
true precommitment devices, which require a binding force external to the 
tempted,205 these rules can be evaded at Time 2. 
Later pressure to deliver legislative benefits is great, and lawmakers 
can and do interpret the rules in manners that allow them to escape their 
penalties at that later point in time. The more times the legislature has to 
apply the rules in order to effectuate policy, the more likely it is that it 
 
203 Block, supra note 60, at 901. 
204 For a discussion of legislative rules as precommitment devices, see Elizabeth Garrett, 
Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 501, 512-13 n.43 (1998), in which she describes supermajority requirements, among other 
legislative rules as “operat[ing] as precommitment devices to avoid collective action problems that 
reduce Congress’s ability to achieve preferred policy outcomes”; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, 
The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 751 (2005), identifying 
precommitment as the driving force behind some legislative rules; and Nancy C. Staudt, 
Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1998), calling a balanced-
budget amendment a precommitment tool. 
205 See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of 
Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (noting that “the individual can enlist others in the 
effort to bind himself” while “[b]y contrast, there is nothing external to society” to bind society in its entirety). 
For the foundational works in precommitment theory, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (expanding on the ideas 
Elster presented in the title essay of ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS); Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and 
the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-107 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling, 
The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57, 76-82 (1984). 
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will engage in evasion of the rules by orchestrating and arbitraging 
differences in the budgetary treatment of its actions. Prompting 
legislation requires several layers of congressional action and thus 
increases the likelihood of budgetary gamesmanship. 
Temporary legislation is a good example of the budgetary system’s inherent 
weakness. As discussed above, the sunset provisions of the Bush tax cuts were 
borne out of the reconciliation process. In prior work, I critiqued the sunsets 
of the Bush tax cuts, along with other sunsets in the tax code, for engaging in 
fiscal illusion since they would likely be renewed without full accounting of 
their costs.206 In fact, this ploy is precisely what ended up happening. When a 
portion of the Bush tax cuts were made permanent in the American Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 2012, Congress specifically exempted that law from statutory 
PAYGO despite the law increasing the deficit by nearly $4 trillion.207 History 
repeated itself in 2015 when Congress permanently enacted a subset of the 
perpetually expiring tax provisions, the so-called tax “extenders.” Just as it did 
with the Bush tax cuts, Congress exempted the extenders from PAYGO, thus 
never paying for the $622 billion worth of tax cuts.208 
This gamesmanship occurred because of several dynamics. First, the 
political impetus to extend the cuts was enormous; once the populace was 
used to low tax rates, it was hard to take them away. Since there was 
nothing to hold Congress to its rules, it bent them under the weight of 
such pressure when they reconsidered the sunsets. Second, contrary to the 
prediction of pro-sunset scholars,209 Congress and other actors eroded the 
stability of the budget baseline (or the starting point for measuring the 
costs of legal change210). This erosion, in turn, allowed for immunity from 
the PAYGO rules.211 Many of the major new provisions in the 2017 tax act 
 
206 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1026-41 (“The JGTRRA tax provisions were 
made temporary, in part, to reduce the costs of the legislation as agreed upon by the legislators 
in light of a growing deficit.”). 
207 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE 
TO H.R.8, THE “AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012,” AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON 
JANUARY 1, 2013 (2013). 
208 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1113 § 1001, 129 Stat. 3035 (2015). 
209 Pro-sunset scholars argue that temporary legislation actually enhances fiscal restraint 
because there is a thorough reckoning of its costs upon each legislative reenactment, unlike 
permanent legislation, which continues without legislative action even though it incurs costs beyond 
the budget window. See Yin, supra note 5, at 180. This argument, however, depends upon consistent 
application of the budget baseline, an assumption that has not borne out in practice. See Kamin & 
Kysar, supra note 49, at 129-30 (“Although Republicans have called for the current policy baseline to 
be used in the context of the tax extenders already in place, they have notably failed to do so for any 
new temporary tax cuts that are enacted with tax reform.”). 
210 See Kamin, supra note 2, at 147 (“The budget baseline . . . is the starting point of the legal 
regime with budgetary effect.”). 
211 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1026-35 (predicting this outcome). 
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are temporary, and we can expect Congress to again erase the costs of 
extension as those sunsets approach. 
The story of congressional experience with sequestration is similar in 
many ways to that of temporary legislation. In these cases, budget rules that 
Congress created were later circumvented when Congress found the pressure 
to deliver legislative benefits too great. In the early 2000s, for instance, 
sequestration was repeatedly avoided because Congress ordered the OMB to 
zero out or reduce PAYGO balances.212 
2. Dynamic Legislation and the Budget Process 
In contrast to the other anti-status quo devices, dynamic legislation reduces 
budgetary gamesmanship because it does not require multiple stages of 
congressional action. The point of dynamic legislation, after all, is to minimize 
the need for later congressional action. Dynamic legislation accordingly does 
not provide as many opportunities that tempt Congress to defect from its 
budgetary goals at subsequent points in time. To be sure, we can anticipate 
some budgetary gimmicks upon the bill’s original enactment. For instance, 
Congress could delay the automatic adjustment period beyond the budgetary 
window if so doing would reduce the bill’s costs. But the gaming opportunities 
presented by dynamic legislation are diminished since, unlike prompting 
legislation, it does not require Congress to act consistently over time.213 
Although dynamic legislation does not readily lend itself to budget 
gamesmanship, it does present estimating difficulties because of its 
conditional nature. To some extent, however, the Congressional Budget Office 
and the other estimators have experience with such an undertaking. For 
instance, revenue estimators currently assume certain changes in the consumer 
price index (“CPI”) when scoring inflation-indexed tax legislation.214 These 
assumptions infuse the revenue estimate with a degree of uncertainty, but one 
that does not jeopardize the usefulness of the revenue-estimating exercise. 
Although the estimators at the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) and 
Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”)215 will have less experience with new 
indices that Congress relies upon or creates, the sorts of challenges they 
present are not insurmountable and, in many senses, are less serious than 
 
212 H.R. REP. NO. 107-350, at 114 (2002) (Conf. Rep.); see also Block, supra note 60, at 866 
(“Congress simply directed the OMB . . .to change the sequester balance to zero.”). 
213 See Kamin & Kysar, supra note 49, at 126 (identifying the inconsistent application of the 
budget baseline between enactment and renewal of temporary tax provisions as the source of budget 
gamesmanship in that context). 
214 See Christopher J. Puckett, Is the Experiment Over? The OMB’s Decision to Change the Game 
Through a Shortening of the Forecast, 11 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 169, 183-85 (analyzing the 
factors considered by CBO when estimating Medicare costs). 
215 See SCHICK, supra note 42. 
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those typically faced by the estimators. CBO and JCT routinely incorporate 
behavioral changes that generate budgetary savings or costs into their revenue 
estimates. For instance, CBO and JCT revenue estimates include changes in 
crop output based on new agricultural policies, differences in the take-up rate 
of certain government benefits due to alterations to those benefits, and 
modifications to capital gains realizations in response to variations in the 
capital gains rate—all uncertain variables. The revenue estimators have even 
recently begun to incorporate changes in behavior that have macroeconomic 
effects, a notoriously complex and difficult modeling exercise.216 Moreover, 
prompting legislation also poses revenue-estimating problems, since the 
likelihood of sequester or sunset is indeterminate. Scoring dynamic 
legislation may be less of a challenge than these categories since the range of 
legislative outcomes it produces may, in fact, be narrower, avoiding the policy 
cliffs that prompting legislation produces. 
Importantly, dynamic legislation could be harnessed to improve upon the 
budget process. Congress could automatically adjust a law, scaling up or down 
its benefits and burdens, to meet a certain revenue target. For instance, many 
times Congress wishes to enact revenue neutral legislation. As circumstances 
play out, however, legislation may start losing (or raising) revenues. Congress 
could instead enact automatic adjustments of the law’s provisions to ensure 
that revenue neutrality is maintained over time. In contrast to most budget 
rules, which can be overcome by a simple majority vote in a single house, 
Congress would only be able to circumvent this type of constraint through 
the Article I lawmaking apparatus. I revisit this possibility below when I 
discuss implementation of dynamic legislation.217 
To summarize, although dynamic legislation presents some challenges for 
the budget process, it does not present as many occasions for pernicious 
budgetary gamesmanship as the other anti-status quo devices. Notably, it also 
presents opportunities to meet budgetary goals in a more effective manner 
than normal budget rules. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The above discussion has shown the democratic advantages of dynamic 
legislation. Other considerations, however, might counsel in favor of employing 
prompting legislation or veto bridges in certain situations. There may be 
legitimate reasons to use prompting legislation or veto bridges—such as sunsets 
in times of experimentation or emergencies—that override the democratic 
 
216 See S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring CBO to incorporate macroeconomic 
effects into its cost estimates for major legislation). 
217 See, e.g., infra note Part IV.B.5.a. 
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disadvantages of the tool. Some tools may also be better at others depending 
on the particular cause of the gridlock in question. Additionally, the devices 
may be used in conjunction with one another. For instance, the legislature could 
enact dynamic legislation through the reconciliation process if bipartisan 
consensus cannot be achieved. Dynamic legislation could also be sunsetted on 
an experimental basis, giving the government an opportunity to assess its 
effectiveness as a new lawmaking tool. The choice is not necessarily one or the 
other, but democratic considerations tend to support the use of dynamic 
legislation, all else being equal. This next section will explore the circumstances 
in which the use of dynamic legislation is particularly promising. 
A. General Principles for Applicability 
As a categorical matter, dynamic legislation will likely have greater 
application when (a) it can be designed with low costs and (b) the law 
presents problems in the aforementioned areas where dynamic legislation 
excels—institutional interaction with the administrative state, 
entrenchment, the political economy, and the budget process. 
As for the former, we can expect dynamic legislation to be more easily 
crafted when the external indicia to which it responds can be quantified. The 
drafting process is simplified if the law changes in accordance with formulas 
or multipliers rather than fact-specific ranges of circumstances. Better yet is 
if the various aspects along which the law is changing are not only quantifiable 
but are able to be compiled into one index. Ever changing law also risks costly 
implementation, but the interpretation and application of the evolving legal 
landscape will be simpler if legal changes respond to clear numerics. 
If the automating mechanisms are easily quantifiable, it may also be more 
likely that Congress can reach consensus on the law. This is because of the 
obvious and somewhat circular point, that more easily quantifiable 
mechanisms mean there is less doubt with regard to their validity in the first 
place. For instance, if climate change risk can be quantified and rolled into a 
single index this likely means that scientific knowledge has coalesced around 
the legitimacy of certain environmental indicators and their impact. 
Quantifiability, however, may also meaningfully and positively influence 
political compromise since it can reduce the amount of uncertainty in the 
direction that the law will take. Lawmakers who fear that the law will 
develop into unanticipated iterations can be somewhat assuaged if a 
numeric range cabins that evolutive path. 
That being said, quantifiability is a helpful but by no means sufficient 
condition to the enactment of dynamic legislation. First, deciding upon the 
makeup of the index may prove vexing. In the inflation context, for 
instance, a longstanding debate still exists between which measure of 
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inflation should be used, and just recently Congress switched to an 
alternative measure in the tax context.218 
Even if an index is developed and agreed upon, there is still the need to 
apply that index to policy. How should, for instance, carbon tax rates respond to 
fluctuations in a climate change index? Drafting a policy response to each 
variation of the index at first seems like a daunting task. In many cases, however, 
policy responses will often be calibrated proportionately to such changes so that 
Congress need only determine the relationship between a single metric—or 
metrics within a specified range—and the policy impact. The policy choice, in 
these instances, really looks no less complex than ordinary legislation. 
Dynamic legislation will also be most desirable in those contexts where it 
outperforms other anti-status quo devices. For instance, if a category of 
legislation is expected to produce political economy concerns because of 
outsized interest group influence, then the ability of dynamic legislation to 
reign in this influence, or at least not exacerbate it compared to prompting 
legislation, will be particularly valuable. Due to its insusceptibility to 
budgetary gamesmanship, dynamic legislation will also be worthwhile to 
pursue in an area of law that interacts heavily with the budgetary process. 
Moreover, we can expect dynamic legislation to pay off in legislative contexts 
that present challenges to delegating policy to the administrative state. 
We can expect that certain areas of law will be more or less conducive to 
the employment of dynamic legislation, depending on whether they share the 
aforementioned features. Notably, fiscal legislation has many of these 
characteristics. First, at the risk of stating the obvious, fiscal policy is an area 
of law whose features are heavily quantifiable. We can automatically adjust 
these features with relative ease because the inputs are quantifiable, and they 
interface quite naturally with indices for this reason as well. 
In addition to presenting relatively low design costs, fiscal policy also 
interacts problematically with the political economy, the administrative state, 
and the budget process, meaning that the benefits that dynamic legislation 
can provide along these axes are substantial. For instance, collective action 
problems may mean that interest groups are able to secure tax benefits at the 
expense of the general public.219 As mentioned above, the interface of fiscal 
policy and the administrative state presents special difficulties since there 
may be constitutional, historical, and normative reasons for favoring less 
delegation in this area.220 Finally, fiscal policy interacts heavily with the 
budget process. The strong political pressures to deliver benefits through the 
 
218 See Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11002, 131 Stat. 2054, 2059 (converting 
cost-of-living adjustments to chained CPI from CPI). 
219 See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369 (1980). 
220 See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
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tax code makes this interaction dysfunctional, causing lawmakers to game 
PAYGO and budget reconciliation rules in the name of tax cuts.221 
Perhaps because of these characteristics, this area of the law already 
contains automatic features. For instance, many federal tax provisions are 
indexed for inflation, as previously discussed.222 Still, there is much more 
room for experimentation and implementation of dynamic legislation in the 
fiscal policy and other contexts, as will be discussed below. One particularly 
promising aspect of dynamic legislation, which the below examples help 
illustrate, is that it allows Congress to adjust laws automatically to take into 
account whether they are meeting expectations. In this manner, dynamic 
legislation can function as a means for Congress to self-evaluate. 
B. Potential Applications 
1. Pigouvian and Similar Taxes 
One area where dynamic legislation should be considered is in the 
Pigouvian tax context. Under economic theory, markets fail when parties do 
not bear the full costs of their actions, thereby producing negative 
externalities. Governments can impose Pigouvian taxes in the amount of such 
externalities, which then cause the parties to internalize the costs of their 
actions.223 The parties are then able to make an economically efficient decision, 
weighing an action’s full costs upon the world against its benefits. 
Of course, assessing the social costs of the activity, and hence the correct 
level of taxation, still poses design challenges. Dynamic legislation could 
address one aspect of this complexity—the social costs of an activity, or the 
information used to calculate them, may not be static. A unit of pollution 
may impact society differently from year to year. In that case, a tax assessed 
on the pollution itself may be correct initially but may then deviate from the 
socially optimal level if the social harm per unit increases or decreases. For 
instance, new information may indicate that the climate is more sensitive to 
carbon dioxide emissions than previously thought. Dynamic legislation, 
perhaps coupled with delegation to a regulating entity, could dynamically 
adjust the tax rates to account for these changes.224 
 
221 See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text. 
222 States have also employed automatic adjustments in the tax context. See David Gamage, 
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 802-04 (2010) 
(“In . . . the property tax systems of twenty-two states . . . the amount of revenue raised is held constant 
as the economy cycles, with tax rates automatically adjusted so as to maintain the revenue targets.”). 
223 See generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (5th ed. 2015). 
224 See Kamin, supra note 5, at 251-53 (making a similar suggestion in this context). 
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Many in the environmental field challenge the idea that setting tax rates 
equal to the social costs of the pollution is sufficient since this will not 
necessarily result in the reduction of emissions. The argument is that the tax 
must also be greater than the marginal cost of abatement, otherwise the 
polluting firm will not reduce emissions.225 Dynamic legislation could also be 
employed to address this challenge by dynamically adjusting the tax in 
response to whether current activities or behaviors, in this case emissions, 
exceed or fall short of a target level. Dynamic legislation, in this case, 
leverages the additional information that the implementation of the tax would 
provide—the cost of abatement. 
One carbon tax proposal, for instance, would create an initial tax, coupled 
with a standard growth rate for the tax that would be applicable during a control 
period.226 Emission targets could be set for certain time intervals. If the targets 
were unmet, the imposition of a higher growth rate for the tax would be 
triggered, which would turn off once emissions fell below the target.227 
2. Nontraditional Phase-Ins and Phase-Outs 
One promising application would be to use dynamic legislation to phase 
in legislative changes. There is an old adage that legal reforms produce 
winners and losers. Phase-ins can mitigate the negative impact upon certain 
parties. Typically, phase-ins work by gradually implementing policies as time 
passes. Rather than make the transition contingent on dates, however, one 
could employ dynamic legislation to make the provisions contingent upon the 
occurrence of external events. This type of phase-in could be particularly 
useful where new policies present uncertainties as to how they will interact 
with the real world. One could design the legislative phase-in so that the 
change is ratcheted up only after certain events occur or if there is evidence 
that the change is generating the desired effects.228 
 
225 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69-70 
(2003) (“[A] system designed to use economic incentives to improve environmental quality must 
establish tax rates exceeding the marginal cost of reductions.”). 
226 See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Cost Containment in Climate Change Policy: Alternative Approaches in 
Mitigating Price Volatility, 29 VA. TAX REV. 381, 391-92 (2009) (noting that under “the Responsive 
Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax (REACT) . . . . [a]n initial tax and standard growth rate for the 
tax is set for the first year of a control period.”). 
227 Id.; see also Larry Karp & John Livernois, Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution 
Emissions, 27 J. ENVT’L. ECON. & MGMT. 38 (1994) (noting that an “iterative procedure which 
adjusts the tax when emissions exceed or fall short of the target” could be used to overcome the 
problem of lack of information about abatement costs). 
228 Charles Whitehead has made a similar suggestion in the regulatory context—that new 
regulation on the financial markets be phased in to accommodate unanticipated consequences. 
Regulators could use the information provided at the initial phase-in stage to then change the 
regulation if necessary. This protects against significant adverse outcomes that would arise if the 
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For instance, central to a recent tax reform proposal was a cash flow 
destination-based tax, which would have turned the current corporate income 
tax into essentially a consumption tax.229 The plan was border adjusted, 
meaning that it excludes exports and taxes imports without deduction for 
costs.230 Controversially, the plan may have impacted prices on imports. 
Under economic models, the value of the dollar should, however, 
correspondingly increase, making the tax neutral vis-à-vis American 
consumers and importers.231 Skepticism in the business and investment 
community regarding the currency adjustments, however, turned out to be a 
major political obstacle to its enactment.232 
One way to assuage those nervous about relying on untested models would 
be to phase in the tax, not simply across time, but to peg its introduction to 
the dollar adjustment. The tax rate could be designed such that it increases by 
a specified percentage for every x% increase in the dollar. This transition rule 
would minimize any negative effects on consumers and importers because the 
lower rate would cap the impact on consumer prices, perhaps appeasing critics 
to a sufficient degree to allow for enactment of the tax.233 
Tom Merrill and David Schizer’s petroleum fuel price stabilization plan 
(PFSP) also proposes dynamic phase-ins. The PFSP would set a floor of 
 
regulation was finalized at the outset. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial 
Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2012). 
229 See HOUSE TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY, OUR VISION FOR A 
CONFIDENT AMERICA: TAX 27-29 (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEZ6-3Z6B]. 
230 Id. at 28 (“[V]alue-added taxes (VATs) . . . include ‘border adjustability’ . . . . This means 
that the tax is rebated when a product is exported to a foreign country and is imposed when a product 
is imported from a foreign country.”). 
231 See Alan J. Auerbach & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, AM. ACTION F., The Role of Border 
Adjustments in International Taxation (2016), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/14344 
[https://perma.cc/MS28-UK28] (“An export subsidy . . . . would also strengthen the dollar as a 
result of the surge in demand for exports, which would partially reduce this demand surge by 
raising the cost of . . . goods abroad.”). 
232 See Richard Rubin, What We Know About Border Adjustment and How It Would Work, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-know-about-border-adjustment-and-
how-it-would-work-1485723571 [https://perma.cc/Z37E-MAWZ] (noting that “large retailers, oil 
refiners and some conservative groups” worry that taxing imports will cause prices to go up). 
233 To be sure, this feature would present design difficulties. First, an economic slowdown may 
occur, thus impeding the dollar’s increase. Alternatively, the dollar may increase for reasons other 
than the tax. Accordingly, it may be difficult to parse out if appreciation due to the border adjustment 
has in fact occurred. It may also be necessary to “back-date” the currency adjustment since the dollar 
will adjust once the border adjustment proposal looks plausible, perhaps necessitating averaging 
mechanisms. Still, a rough justice rule could suffice here. No matter what contributes to the dollar 
appreciation, if it occurs, it will go a long way to assuaging the fear of importers. A second problem 
occurs if you phase in the tax’s exclusion for exports. This may harm exporters who would have a 
difficult time selling their goods abroad. Phasing in only the import side while also providing full 
exclusion for exports immediately would, however, generate substantial revenue losses.  
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$3.50-$4.00 per gallon of gas and would assess a fuel levy if the price of gas 
fell below that threshold.234 The levy would rise as world oil prices fell and, 
conversely, would fall as prices rose. One version of the plan employs a 
traditional phase-in, raising the price threshold over time.235 However, 
another variation adopts a type of nontraditional phase-in by providing that 
the threshold trail any upward movements of the retail price, until the 
threshold is set to the desired level.236 
3. Countercyclical Laws 
In times of economic downturn, lawmakers and regulators can employ 
tools to assist in stabilizing the economy. Monetary policy is the most often 
employed countercyclical measure largely because the Federal Reserve can 
quickly adjust interest rates in response to economic conditions. Post-Great 
Recession, however, many economists have questioned whether monetary 
policy alone is a sufficient response, especially in the face of dramatic 
downturns.237 There might be a floor, for instance, to which interest rates can 
be lowered without harmfully impacting the dollar or creating future 
bubbles.238 Fiscal policy, such as increased spending and tax cuts, may then 
be necessary. Other advantages to fiscal policy are that they are often faster 
acting and can be crafted to reach specific recipients.239 
Still, economists and others often distrust countercyclical fiscal measures 
because of design difficulties.240 In order to be effective and not 
 
234 Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed 
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5, 32 (2010). The PFSP essentially 
stabilizes oil prices so that they will not decline below a floor. This incentivizes consumers and 
manufactures to commit to investments in new behavior and technology. 
235 Id. at 9-10. 
236 Id. at 10. 
237 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical? 7 (Coase-
Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 782, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2866464 (“[T]he Federal Reserve’s ability to stimulate the economy by 
lowering interest rates is limited. In a severe economic downturn, even lowering interest rates to 
zero might not be enough to effectively stimulate the economy.”). 
238 See Summers Testimony on Fiscal Stimulus, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2008), 
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/01/16/summers-testimony-on-fiscal-stimulus, [hereinafter Summers 
Testimony] (reprinting Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers’s testimony before the Joint 
Economic Committee in which he stated that “full reliance on monetary policy could easily mean 
lowering interest rates to levels that would be problematic for the dollar, commodity prices, future 
asset bubbles and moral hazard”). 
239 Id. 
240 See J. Bradford DeLong and Laura D. Tyson, Discretionary Fiscal Policy as a Stabilization 
Policy Tool: What Do We Think Now That We Did Not Think in 2007? 2 (April 5, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.imf.rg/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/fiscal/pdf/tyson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZY4X-EBDT] (“Legislatures are, by design, institutions that find it very difficult 
to make decisions quickly . . . . Fiscal policies that take effect this year as a result of decisions made 
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counterproductive, fiscal stimulus must be “timely, temporary, and 
targeted.”241 Dynamic legislation can be utilized to achieve all three of these 
factors, and so could be employed in the countercyclical context, both in the 
tax and spending areas. First, dynamic legislation can be designed to 
immediately spring into life once a measure of economic weakness occurs, 
thus ensuring that the legislative response is timely. Possible triggers could 
be the unemployment rate, negative economic growth, or when the federal 
funds rate is at or near 0%.242 Dynamic legislation can also phase out as those 
conditions improve to ensure it is temporary. Finally, fiscal policy generally 
allows for targeted relief—for instance to the middle and lower classes—in a 
way that monetary policy cannot. Dynamic legislation might offer the ability 
to target measures even further. For instance, it could be used to deliver 
benefits to those regions most affected by the downturn. Regional provisions 
are discussed below.243 
Recent scholarship has focused on how the legal system might respond to 
macroeconomic conditions. Zachary Liscow has proposed that bankruptcy 
rules be “counter-cyclical,” prescribing that bankruptcy judges consider the 
employment effects of their cases based on the unemployment rate.244 
Although interesting, this proposal suffers from the critique that it stretches 
the institutional competence of the judiciary, which may be ill-equipped to 
make judgments concerning the economy at large. A Congress-centered 
approach that sets countercyclical measures into motion upon the presence of 
certain indicators as is proposed herein, does not face this structural critique. 
 
by a legislature last year based on information from two or three years ago would seem to guarantee 
sub-optimal economic outcomes.”). 
241 Summers Testimony, supra note 238. 
242 Masur and Posner consider each of these triggers in the context of countercyclical 
regulation. See Masur & Posner, supra note 237, at 26-28. 
243 See infra notes 246–248 and accompanying text. 
244 Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for Employment-
Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2016) (proposing “to systematize 
what is currently an ad hoc trade-off by making bankruptcy law explicitly counter-cyclical-that 
is, placing more weight on preserving employment during times of high unemployment”). For 
other work suggesting that the law should take into account macroeconomic factors, see Zachary 
D. Liscow & William A. Woolston, How Income Taxes Should Change During Recessions, 70 TAX L. 
REV. 627 (2017) (recommending maximizing social welfare by subsidizing nonemployment and 
subsidizing employers for hiring, as opposed to employees); Yair Listokin, Law and 
Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 559, 
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828352 (positing that the law should 
promote spending in times of recessions); Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law and 
Macroeconomics (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 567, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860283 (exploring the situations in which the law should respond to 
macroeconomic concerns). Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 237 (cautioning that countercyclical regulation 
be adopted on an experimental basis given the uncertainty in underlying empirical assumptions). 
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4. Regionally Targeted Legislation 
Another area where dynamic legislation could be effectively employed is 
legislation targeted to regions.245 Fine tuning federal policy in this manner 
might generate positive welfare effects. Take, for instance, the fact that federal 
taxes are assessed on nominal incomes, without regard to cost of living 
differences between areas. This policy discourages taxpayers from working 
and living in higher-paying cities. Although salaries and property values 
adjust to make up for the federal tax disparity, the non-neutrality between tax 
bills in locales results in an inefficient employment distribution. Indexing 
taxes to local wages, however, would neutralize most of this distortion.246 
Automatically tying federal benefits to the specific needs of a region could 
also be beneficial from fairness and budgetary standpoints. In the 
countercyclical context, for instance, extensions of federal unemployment 
insurance are automatically triggered if state unemployment conditions 
exceed a certain threshold.247 This type of program has the potential to 
engender fairness by ensuring the residents of the neediest states receive 
benefits. It also saves costs by narrowly tailoring benefits and by allowing 
those benefits to be calculated with administrative ease. 
Extending regional automatic mechanisms to other spending programs 
could produce similar benefits. Suppose, for instance, that Congress adopted 
measures to address the opioid epidemic, which is a nationwide crisis with 
varying and fluctuating degrees of severity across regions.248 It could decide 
to allocate funds on a continuing basis according to the extent of the crisis at 
the state level, using factors such as overdose and addiction rates. Other crises 
could be addressed in a similar manner. Ongoing disaster preparedness funds, 
for instance, could be distributed to states in accordance with their climate-
related risks. Or funds for adult education could be distributed to those states 
hit hardest by the overall decline in manufacturing jobs. 
Dynamic legislation allows Congress to adapt federal policy to regional 
needs. The political events of the twenty-first century suggest widespread 
frustration that the federal government has failed to address the fact that the 
 
245 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Bridging the Red-Blue Divide: A Proposal for U.S. 
Regional Tax Relief, (Univ. of Mich. Public Law Research Paper No. 620), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249010 (exploring fiscal equalization mechanisms and recommending 
federal tax relief to corporations who invest in poorer locations in the U.S.). 
246 See generally Albouy, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 9; Knoll & Griffith, supra note 9. 
247 Stephen Bingham, Replace Welfare for Contingent Workers with Unemployment Compensation, 
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937, 952 (1995). Some would contend that the threshold is set too high, thus 
preventing access to the program by those in need, but this is not a criticism of the automatic 
mechanism per se. See id. 
248 See, e.g., Drug Overdose Death Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/728R-3Q7W] (providing 
overdose statistics by state). 
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rewards and strains of the modern economy fall unevenly across states, 
creating winners and losers. We can expect that the complexities of challenges 
like globalization, the displacement of jobs by technology, and climate change 
will continue to have varied, regional effects. Rather than employing blunt 
instruments, the federal government would benefit states by using carefully 
crafted remedies. With dynamic legislation, Congress can do so without 
needing to continually revisit the law and without ceding control over policy 
to the executive branch. 
5. Intralegal and Budgetary Measures 
a. Overall budget constraints 
One most naturally thinks of dynamic legislation as allowing for the law 
to adjust based on external factors. Dynamic legislation, however, can also be 
used so that the law responds to changes within other parts of the legal 
system. This would create interesting opportunities to coordinate broad social 
policies across areas of law by tying them together. For instance, health care 
policy could be adjusted, not only for current health care costs, but also for 
current entitlement commitments and tax expenditures in the area. 
Intralegal measures might be especially powerful when used in 
conjunction with an overall budget constraint. In contrast to internal budget 
rules, the budgetary constraint could be built into the substance of the law. 
Congress thus would find it much less easy to evade. For instance, in the 
early 1980s, proposed legislation would have limited the amount of revenue 
lost to tax expenditures to no more than thirty percent of the net revenues 
collected in the fiscal year.249 The mechanism, however, was a procedural 
rule, enforced by a point of order, against any budget resolution that 
contained tax expenditures exceeding thirty percent of the recommended 
level for net revenue set forth in the resolution. Congress could thus easily 
evade the rule due to its procedural status. 
One could imagine, however, this budget constraint, or something similar, 
embedded within the substantive statute. For instance, the prior year’s 
revenues could dictate the total level of tax expenditures available to 
taxpayers. If revenue benchmarks are met, then the tax expenditures could be 
automatically granted in whole. 
In the Social Security context, David Kamin has suggested that benefits 
and taxes be automatically adjusted if the system is projected to become 
insolvent.250 On the tax side, for instance, the payroll tax rates could be 
 
249 Tax Expenditure Limitation and Control Act of 1981, S. 193, 97th Cong. 
250 Kamin, supra note 11, at 32. 
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automatically increased (or decreased if the projections improve). On the 
spending side, benefits could be automatically reduced, perhaps hitting only 
new beneficiaries or those with higher lifetime earnings. To develop this 
further, it is also possible that the spending and tax changes be tied to one 
another. For instance, suppose lawmakers are committed to solvency but can 
tolerate only so much in benefit cuts. The tax increases could be structured 
such that they make up any shortfall in the system’s solvency after taking into 
account the savings produced by the benefit cuts. 
On a more ambitious level, David Scott Louk and David Gamage have 
argued that default budget policies, which are triggered if legislators do not 
pass a budget, could cure the games of chicken and negotiating failures that 
have come to define the “new fiscal politics.”251 A default budget at the federal 
level could be implemented, they suggest, by updating the prior year’s budget 
to reflect changes in population and the economy, assigning an agency the 
task of adjusting taxes and spending based on predetermined formulas.252 
b. “Reverse Earmarking” 
Some states have experimented with tying revenues to budgetary 
constraints. At the federal level and in most states, the gas tax is calculated 
on a per unit (typically gallon) basis, not as a percentage of purchase price. 
As a result, gas tax revenues do not increase as gasoline prices rise. Indeed, 
in the current era, increasing fuel efficiency and inflation have devastated 
revenues from the gas tax, both at the federal and state levels. In response, 
some states have begun indexing the gas tax rate to inflation or to a percentage 
of the price of gas.253 In a more unorthodox move, Nebraska adjusts the gas 
tax to the state’s transportation spending in an attempt to ensure adequate 
revenues for transportation projects.254 Nebraska’s gas tax is analogous to the 
practice of earmarking, which dedicates revenues to a specific purpose, but 
differs in important respects. Earmarking is pursued in order to guarantee 
steady sources of funding for the program at issue, but it is criticized for 
reducing the legislature’s flexibility in establishing funding priorities.255 A tax 
like the Nebraska gas tax—let’s call it “reverse earmarking”—allows the 
government to first ascertain its spending priorities in certain areas and then 
 
251 David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default 
Rules for Budgets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 182, 185-86 (2015). 
252 Id. at 246-47. 
253 RICHARD C. AUXIER, REFORMING STATE GAS TAXES: HOW STATES ARE (AND ARE 
NOT) ADDRESSING AN ERODING TAX BASE 9 (2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413286-Reforming-State-Gas-Taxes.PDF [https://perma.cc/HVM8-9NFX]. 
254 Id. 
255 For a positive defense of earmarking, see generally Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The 
Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX. REV. 55 (2006). 
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adjust the tax accordingly to fund those priorities. This type of mechanism 
could ensure funding of specific government activities without forcing the 
government’s hand as to spending levels ex ante. 
States have also capped tax rates to maintain a static amount of revenue 
from year to year. This is done at the property tax level in response to concerns 
that local governments were receiving extra revenues as property values 
increased.256 These automatically adjusting rates generate the same amount of 
revenues from year to year even though the value of the tax base has changed. 
Reverse earmarking is essentially a less libertarian version of this mechanism, 
instead adjusting tax rates based on current government spending. 
c. Tax “Triggers” and Responsible Tax Cutting 
States have also recently experimented with so called tax “triggers,” 
which phase in tax cuts or other tax reform measures when the state meets 
pre-established fiscal targets, such as growth in revenues.257 The triggers are 
justified on the basis of promoting fiscal responsibility, although the states’ 
experiences on this front have been mixed. For instance, in 2014, Oklahoma 
tied tax cuts to estimated revenues as opposed to actual revenues, causing 
tax cuts to be triggered even though the state’s deficits were rapidly 
increasing.258 The legislature was then forced to repeal the trigger so that a 
second round of tax cuts did not go into effect.259 In contrast, in 2014 the 
District of Columbia enacted tax cuts that were triggered when actual, 
realized revenue exceeded budgeted revenue. Revenues, in fact, increased, 
and the tax cuts went into effect in 2018.260 
Triggers have the potential to allow governments some degree of 
predictability in their revenue stream while also letting an increase in 
revenues be designated for tax relief,261 allowing for a phenomenon that we 
might call “responsible tax cutting.” Triggers could also assist in achieving 
consensus over broader tax reform. For instance, if agreement cannot be 
reached over appropriate revenue offsets for tax cuts, the cuts might be 
 
256 Gamage, supra note 222, at 802-04. 
257 Richard C. Auxier, A Tale of Two Tax Triggers, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 17, 2017), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tale-two-tax-triggers [https://perma.cc/S9XU-2UUD]. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. Some legislators have argued in favor of delaying the cuts and spending the additional 
revenue on education. Peter Jamison, D.C. Council is Urged to Consider Delaying Landmark Tax Cuts, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-council-to-
consider-delays-to-landmark-tax-cuts/2017/04/27/24c14390-2af6-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/894V-7SFZ]. 
261 Jared Walczak, Designing Tax Triggers: Lessons from the States, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 7, 2016), 
https://taxfoundation.org/designing-tax-triggers-lessons-states [https://perma.cc/8YCL-VKNN]. 
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delayed until revenue goals are attained.262 Experience with the triggers, 
however, underscores that they must be carefully designed—a lesson that can 
be extended to all dynamic legislation. In addition to accounting for actual 
revenues, triggers should account for actual revenue growth rather than the 
effects of inflation or a temporary rebound in revenues.263 They should, for 
instance, be based on multi-year estimates of revenues and spending.264 
During the 2017 debate over tax reform, revenue triggers were explored. 
Senate deficit hawks proposed to roll back the tax cuts in TCJA if the law’s 
deficit impact turned out to be worse than advertised.265 It is important, 
however, that any such triggers not be used in a symbolic fashion to justify 
unaffordable tax cuts.  
Collectively, these examples show that states, as laboratories of 
democracy,266 have already begun experimenting with dynamic legislation in 
the budgeting context. The federal government can benefit from their 
experiences. Indeed, recent federal tax proposals seem to suggest that 
automatically adjusting budget-related measures are spreading to the national 
arena, although caution should be exercised in their design.267 
 
262 Indeed, the District of Columbia’s triggers came about as part of a large tax reform package 
when the D.C. Council did not adopt all of the proposed revenue offsets. Auxier, supra note 257. 
263 See Walczak, supra note 261. 
264 See MICHAEL MAZEROV & MARLANA WALLACE, REVENUE ‘TRIGGERS’ FOR STATE 
TAX CUTS PROVIDE ILLUSION OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/files/atoms/files/2-6-17sfp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7Q6-UFZ5] (arguing that without the 
information gathered from such estimates “policymakers cannot responsibly evaluate the tax cuts’ 
impact on state services”). Particular care should also be taken so that the trigger mechanism does 
not become an antistimulus measure during an economic downturn, though all static tax rates pose 
this danger. Walczak, supra note 261. 
265 The Senate Parliamentarian scuttled this plan, ruling that the trigger did not meet Byrd 
Rule requirements because it did not have a budgetary impact. Pramuk, supra note 13. In one version 
of the tax bill, certain delayed tax increases were repealed if revenues turned out to be higher than 
expected. Problematically, this “reverse trigger” was designed such that the tax increases could be 
turned off even if revenues were well below the level “to avoid unsustainable deficits or even fully 
make up for this legislation’s tax cut up until that point.” David Kamin, The Senate’s Revenue-Trigger 
Giveaway to Businesses, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/the-
senates-revenue-trigger-giveaway-to-businesses-97b73a624ec1 [https://perma.cc/B4Y3-KLZU]. In 
general, reverse triggers may exacerbate the tendency for lawmakers to engage in short-termism in 
fiscal planning. This could be combated by ensuring that tax increases also take effect if there are 
revenue shortfalls (by employing traditional triggers). Additionally, this experience cautions that 
correctly setting the trigger level of revenues is essential. 
266 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”). 
267 One could ask why dynamic legislation is underutilized if it has the benefits I contend 
exist. These examples, however, show governments are beginning to experiment with this 
category of legislation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, this Article has argued that, along democratic axes, dynamic 
legislation categorically outperforms other devices—such as reconciliation, 
sequestration, and sunsets—that Congress uses to temper the status quo bias 
in American lawmaking. Dynamic legislation allows Congress to retain some 
control over policy by avoiding or narrowing delegation to agencies, without 
expending resources on frequently updating the law. Dynamic legislation 
frees later congresses to effectuate their agenda, rather than to simply race 
against changing environs to keep original legislative bargains in place. 
Dynamic legislation also has the potential to function like a veil of ignorance 
rule—bestowing benefits and burdens upon unknown constituencies—and 
thus reduces interest group activity. Finally, by removing the need for future 
congressional actions, dynamic legislation reduces opportunities for 
budgetary gamesmanship. Dynamic legislation may even improve upon the 
budget process by statutorily pegging policy to revenue goals. 
As a result of these benefits, Congress should make more frequent and 
creative use of dynamic legislation, especially in areas of law that present 
democratic concerns and where the availability of quantitative measures 
reduces design costs, such as fiscal policy. Although our laws will never 
entirely be on autopilot, dynamic legislation equips Congress with a tool to 
better maintain its legislative intent across time. 
